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Articles
Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment
Arbitration from the Steelworkers
Trilogy to Gilmert
by
MARTIN H. MALIN* and ROBERT F. LADENSON**
I. Introduction
Labor arbitration has been hailed as one of the most successful inno-
vations to result from collective bargaining. Arbitrating claims arising
under a collective bargaining agreement is cheaper, faster, and less for-
mal than litigating them in court. Furthermore, the parties control the
arbitration procedure and can tailor it to meet their needs. The use of
arbitration as the final method for adjudicating disputes has become al-
most universal practice in collective bargaining agreements. 1
In contrast to the relatively low cost, speed, efficiency, and informal-
ity of collectively bargained arbitration systems, litigation tends to in-
volve procedural complexity, delay, and substantial expense.
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1. The Bureau of National Affairs estimates that 98% of collective bargaining agree-
ments provide for arbitration of grievances. BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, BASIc PAT-
TERNS IN UNION CoNTRAcTs 37 (12th ed. 1989).
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Dissatisfaction with these characteristics of litigation has led to a bur-
geoning alternative dispute resolution (ADR) movement, which accords
a significant role to arbitration. Traditionally, courts had refused to en-
force agreements to arbitrate. Recently, however, with the growing pop-
ularity of ADR, courts have abandoned their traditional hostility toward
arbitration and openly embraced agreements to arbitrate.2
The role of collective bargaining as the dominant regulator of the
workplace has declined steadily during the past twenty years.3 Accom-
panying this decline has been a continuing increase in external legal con-
straints on employer actions. These external constraints have involved
statutes and common-law causes of action that subject employers to po-
tentially costly multiple causes of action, capable of being litigated simul-
taneously in several forums.4 Hoping to duplicate many of the
advantages found in arbitration under collective bargaining agreements,
an increasing number of employers have established arbitration systems
for resolving disputes in the nonunionized workplace.5
The decline of collective bargaining and the accompanying rise of
nonunion employment arbitration has fostered debate over whether, and
if so to what extent, arbitration can be imported from the unionized to
the nonunionized workplace.6 The labor arbitration profession itself is
divided over whether to embrace arbitration in the absence of a collective
bargaining agreement.7
2. See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477
(1989) (overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
3. The percentage of all workers in the United States who are union members has de-
clined from a high of 35.5% in 1945 to a low of 15.8% in 1992. As of 1992, only 11.5% of
workers in the private sector were union members. Proportion of Union Members Hits 15.8
Percent [1 Analysis/New & Background Information], LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No.142, at
180-81 (Feb. 15, 1993) (reporting on data released by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of
Labor Statistics).
4. See Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard,
67 NEB. L. REV. 7 (1988).
5. One study found that 17% of nonunion businesses had third-party arbitration sys-
tems for manufacturing and production employees, 24% had such systems for clerical employ-
ees, 21% for professional and technical employees, and 20% for managers. David Lewin,
Grievance Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces: An Empirical Analysis of Usage, Dynamics,
and Outcomes, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 823, 824-25 (1990).
6. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes without Unions, 66
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753 (1990); Matthew W. Finkin, Commentary on "Arbitration of Employ-
ment Disputes Without Unions, " 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 799 (1990); Samuel Estreicher, Reply
to Professor Finkin, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 817 (1990); Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration
and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J. 916 (1979); G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal
Employment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute" for the
Courts?, 68 TEX. L. REV. 509 (1990).
7. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE ACADEMY'S ROLE, IF
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The Supreme Court gave employment arbitration a large boost in its
decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.8 The Court held
that a securities broker was bound to arbitrate his claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) because he had, as part of
his registration application with the securities exchanges, agreed to arbi-
trate all claims arising out of his employment. The Court held that the
Federal Arbitration Act's policy favoring enforcement of agreements to
arbitrate compelled arbitration of Gilmer's ADEA claim.9 The Court
refused to find in the ADEA, and by implication in other federal equal
employment opportunity statutes, a policy against compelling arbitration
or otherwise waiving the right to litigate.10
An expansive reading of Gilmer would enforce agreements to arbi-
trate found in any employment contract with respect to any statutory or
common-law cause of action. It would give employers a powerful incen-
tive to require all employees to enter agreements to arbitrate. Arbitra-
tion would enable employers to consolidate several potential claims that
otherwise could be litigated in multiple forums into one relatively cheap
and quick proceeding."1
Scholars have cautioned against the wholesale arbitration of statu-
tory claims. They question the wisdom of privatizing the adjudication of
issues involving public law. Public forums, they urge, protect basic legal
values, whereas private forums, such as arbitration, may resolve disputes
on the basis of nonlegal social mores. Moreover, many issues of public
law require choosing between conflicting public values, a task that should
be reserved for judges and other public officials who are charged with
making law in the public interest.12
ANY, WITH REGARD TO ALTERNATIVE LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES (Nat'l
Academy of Arbitrators), Apr. 29, 1992.
8. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
9. Id at 1652.
10. Id at 1653.
11. See Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.), cert de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992) (requiring arbitration of claims under federal Employee Polygraph
Protection Act, state polygraph protection act, and state defamation law). Some employer
lawyers are advocating, in light of Gilmer, that employers adopt mandatory predispute arbitra-
tion or other ADR systems for resolving potential claims. See Frank C. Morris, Jr. Arbitration
After Gilmer, PRAC. LAw., June 1992, at 76-80; Evan J. Spelfogel, New Trends in the Arbitra-
tion of Employment Disputes, ARB. J., Mar. 1993, at 6; Costs of Litigation, Gilmer Decision
Encourage Alternative Dispute Resolution, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 243, at A-8 (Dec. 18,
1991); Lawyer Says Use ofArbitration for Non-Union Employees Will Grow, DAILY LAB. REP.
(BNA) No. 99, at A-5 (May 22, 1990).
12. See, eg., Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternate Dispute Resolution, 62
TUL. L. REv. 1 (1987); Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea orAnath-
ema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668, 671-72 (1986) [hereinafter Edwards, Panacea or Anathema?].
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This Article looks to jurisprudential theory for answers to the con-
cerns over the privatization of justice. Part II develops the role of arbi-
tration and the rationale behind a policy favoring labor arbitration (i.e.,
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements). Part III contrasts
the role of and policies regarding employment arbitration (Le., arbitra-
tion in the nonunion setting). Whereas policies favoring labor arbitration
are premised on its role as an instrument of workplace self-governance,
policies favoring employment arbitration are premised on concern for ef-
ficiency in dispute resolution. Part IV reviews three well-known juris-
prudential theories about the nature of law: Legal Realism, H.L.A.
Hart's version of Legal Positivism, and Ronald Dworkin's conception of
Law as Integrity.
Part V uses these theories about the nature of law to develop theo-
ries of personal and institutional constraints on the adjudicatory role in
labor and employment arbitration. This Article argues that Legal Real-
ism provides the best normative and descriptive theory of the adjudica-
tory role of labor arbitrators. It considers and rejects the case for
extending the Legal Realist model to employment arbitration. It con-
tends, instead, that H.L.A. Hart's version of Legal Positivism provides
the best jurisprudential theory for analyzing the personal constraints on
employment arbitrators. The analysis suggests that employment arbitra-
tors should place predominant weight on judicial caution when interpret-
ing employment statutes. It also suggests a more active role for courts in
reviewing employment arbitration awards than in reviewing labor
awards. This Article advocates an approach to judicial review that seeks
to preserve the efficiency gains of employment arbitration without sacri-
ficing the public justice goals of statutory and common-law regulation of
the employment relationship.
II. Arbitration Under Collective Bargaining Agreements
The typical collective bargaining agreement provides that claims
arising under the agreement must be submitted to a multi-step grievance
procedure. Although the number of steps varies with the needs of the
parties, the procedure usually provides for consideration of the claim at
successively higher levels within the union and employer structures. If
the parties are unable to resolve the claim through these successive levels
of negotiation, they may submit it to a mutually selected third party for
binding arbitration.1 3
13. See BASIC PATTERNS IN UNION CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 33.
[Vol. 44
The initial judicial reaction to grievance arbitration was hostile be-
cause the courts regarded it as substituting a private adjudicator for a
court in the determination of contract rights. Courts refused to enforce
agreements to arbitrate when they believed that the claim lacked merit,
reasoning, "If the meaning of the provision of the contract sought to be
arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate
... .14 Similarly, courts reviewed de novo the merits of arbitration
awards when asked to enforce them. They justified de novo review, rea-
soning that if, in the court's view, the award misinterpreted the contract,
the award exceeded the arbitrator's authority by effectively amending the
contract. 15
In Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills,1 6 the
Supreme Court federalized the law of grievance arbitration by interpret-
ing Section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act17 as a mandate
for the development of a federal common law of collective bargaining
agreements. Three years later in the Steelworkers Trilogy (The Trilogy),1 8
the Court broadly swept aside the judicial hostility toward grievance ar-
bitration and required courts to give broad deference to arbitral deci-
sions. Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a court may not
substitute its view of the merits of a grievance for the arbitrator's. The
court must enforce the arbitration award as long as it draws its essence
from the collective agreement. 19 Furthermore, to avoid unnecessary en-
tanglement in the merits of the grievance, a court must enforce agree-
ments to arbitrate unless it can be said with positive assurance that the
dispute is not arbitrable.20 A court must never premise a refusal to order
arbitration on its view of the merits of the grievance, even if it believes
the grievance to be patently frivolous.2 '
Courts and scholars have offered many reasons to support the lim-
ited role The Trilogy established for courts in reviewing labor grievances.
14. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 67 N.Y.S.2d 317, 318
(N.Y. App. Div.), affid, 74 N.E.2d 464 (N.Y. 1947).
15. See, eg., Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n, 86 N.E.2d
162, 165 (N.Y. 1949); Screen Cartoonists Guild Local 852 v. Disney, 168 P.2d 983, 984 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1946).
16. 353 U.S. 448, 456-59 (1957).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
18. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steel-
workers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
19. Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597. For a discussion of lower court implementation of
the "draws its essence from the contract" standard, see Lewis B. Kaden, Judges and Arbitra-
tors: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 285-89 (1980).
20. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582-83.
21. American Mfg., 363 U.S. at 568.
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They have observed that because parties usually select arbitrators for
their expertise in labor relations, arbitrators are better suited than judges
to adjudicate labor grievances.22 They have also urged that the speed
and cost-effectiveness of arbitration depend on its finality as a dispute
resolution process. 23 If judicial reversal is too readily available, arbitra-
tion will lose its finality and, with it, its comparative efficiency advan-
tages over litigation.
While these systemic advantages support the judicial embrace of la-
bor arbitration, they are not the primary reason for it. Rather, the rela-
tive roles of court and arbitrator articulated in The Trilogy result from
the recognition that grievance arbitration is not comparable to litigation
of traditional contract rights, but is a part of the collective bargaining
process that governs the workplace.
Although the collective bargaining agreement is judicially enforcea-
ble, labor arbitration does not function primarily as a litigation alterna-
tive. Instead, arbitration is an alternative to the strike.24 Courts regard
the arbitration provision as a quid pro quo for a no strike clause. 25 This
rationale acknowledges that the collective bargaining agreement does not
confer rights in the same way as a traditional contract. Instead, it pro-
vides a generalized code governing terms and conditions of employ-
ment.26 The provisions of the agreement take on meaning only as
applied to particular situations. Thus, in the collective agreement, par-
ties agree to be bound by the general principles they articulate, but leave
the refinement of those principles into specific contract rights to case-by-
case negotiation through the grievance procedure. If, however, grievance
negotiations do not produce agreement, instead of relying on strikes and
other economic weapons to settle the dispute, parties provide that they
will be bound by the settlement awarded by an arbitrator.
22. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 582.
23. See, e.g., FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 9
(4th ed. 1985) (observing that speed and reduced expense are two of many advantages of arbi-
tration); Tim Borenstein, Introduction to the System of Labor and Employment Arbitration, in
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION at § 1.01 (Tim Borenstein & Ann Gosline eds.,
1992) (including same observations).
24. In Warrior & Gulf, the Court observed that Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)
(overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989)),
discussed infra at text accompanying notes 85-89, and similar cases were reluctant to enforce
commercial agreements to arbitrate, and found such cases inapplicable to grievance arbitra-
tion. The Court reasoned that commercial arbitration is a substitute for litigation, but griev-
ance arbitration is a substitute for industrial strife. 363 U.S. at 578.
25. See Boys Market, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 249 (1970).
26. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 578.
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The ability to defer specification of contract rights to case-by-case
negotiations facilitates the reaching of collective agreements in many
ways. Such deferral enables the parties to resolve diametrically opposite
positions on certain issues peacefully by agreeing on contract language
without agreeing on what the language means. The meaning of the lan-
guage is deferred to case-by-case negotiation through the grievance pro-
cedure, with arbitration as a substitute for the strike if negotiations reach
impasse.27
For example, consider the issue of promotions within the bargaining
unit. The union often initially demands that seniority strictly govern
promotions or that seniority govern among all bidders meeting the mini-
mum qualifications for the position. The company often demands that it
have the right to unreviewable discretion in filling vacancies or that pro-
motions be governed strictly by merit. The modified seniority clause,
providing that seniority will govern when candidates' qualifications are
relatively equal, is a common compromise. 28 When the parties agree to
this compromise, they recognize that they do not agree on what it means.
The company recognizes that the union will emphasize the word "rela-
tively" and the union recognizes that the company will emphasize the
word "equal" in deciding whether competing employees' qualifications
are "relatively equal" so that seniority will govern the promotion. Both
parties recognize that the union will seek to limit and the company will
seek to expand the company's ability to select a junior employee.
The modified seniority clause does not represent the conferral of
specific contractual rights, or even expectations. Rather, it represents a
company-union decision to defer resolution of their differences over the
relative roles of qualifications and seniority to case-by-case negotiations
through the grievance procedure, and to substitute arbitration for strikes
and lockouts as the method of resolving impasses in those negotiations.
27. See generally Archibald Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1482, 1491 (1959) (stating that parties often agree to language "although each knows that the
other places a different meaning upon the words and they share only the common intent to
postpone the issue and take a gamble upon an arbitrator's ruling if decision is required");
Claire B. McDermott, An Exercise in Dialectic" Should Arbitration Behave As Does Litigation?,
PROC. 33D ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 1, 6 (1980) (illustrating how union and manage-
ment agree to language that would allow them to argue for their position when and if arbitra-
tion becomes necessary); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68
HARV. L. REv. 999, 1004 (1955) ("Since the parties earnestly strive to complete an agreement,
there is almost irresistible pressure to find a verbal formula which is acceptable, even though
its meaning to the two sides may in fact differ.").
28. The Bureau of National Affairs estimates that 25% of all collective bargaining agree-
ments contain such modified seniority clauses governing promotions. BAsIc PATTERNS IN
UNION CONTRACTS, supra note 1, at 88.
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Deferral of consideration of specific contract rights to case-by-case
negotiations also facilitates agreement when a condition of employment
governs such a wide variety of potential situations as to make specificity
in the collective agreement infeasible.29 For example, consider the typi-
cal collective agreement provision limiting discipline and discharge by
requiring just cause. It would be impossible to specify all of the circum-
stances that might arguably give rise to discipline or to specify what dis-
cipline would be appropriate in each situation. Instead, the parties set
forth a general principle in their collective agreement that limits manage-
ment's discretion in imposing discipline, but also leaves management free
to act when justified. The specifics of what amounts to "cause" and what
level of discipline is appropriate are left to case-by-case negotiation
through the grievance procedure and, in some cases, to a pre-disciplinary
conference in which the union participates. If the union believes that a
particular dispute can not be resolved through negotiation, rather than
strike, the union has the option of challenging the disciplinary action in
arbitration.30
Thus, the typical collective bargaining agreement does not confer
legal rights in the same manner as a traditional contract. The legal rights
conferred by a collective bargaining agreement are procedural. The em-
ployer gains the right to prevent the union from striking and the union
gains the right to force the employer to arbitration.31 Within the context
of these procedural rights, the parties negotiate the substance of their
contract rights on a case-by-case basis, substituting arbitration for strikes
as their ultimate impasse resolution tool.32 Of course, the parties are still
free to decide against using arbitration as their dispute resolution pro-
cess. Occasionally they do, and the union retains the right to strike. 33
Such instances are rare, and the law encourages the trade-off of a no
strike clause for binding arbitration.
29. Dean Harry Shulman referred to such provisions as those providing "more or less
specific standards which require reason and judgment in their application." Shulman, supra
note 27, at 1005.
30. See id. at 1006-07.
31. See David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CAL. L. Rnv. 663, 742 (1973).
32. We do not mean to imply that all provisions of the typical collective bargaining agree-
ment are as vague or indefinite as those governing discipline and promotions. Some provisions
are quite specific, such as those setting forth the wage scale, holidays, and vacation accruals.
When provisions are specific, disputes are less likely to arise. When they do arise, however,
they are resolved in the same manner-subjected to the continuing process of collective bar-
gaining with arbitration as the ultimate method of resolving a bargaining impasse. For an
example of such a dispute, see Ceres Terminals, Inc., 92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 735 (1989) (Malin,
Arb.).
33. See Groves v. Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168 (1990).
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This understanding of the collective bargaining agreement as estab-
lishing generalized principles, which are translated into specific contract
rights through case-by-case negotiations and of grievance arbitration as
the substitute for strikes in resolving negotiation impasses, underlies the
Court's rulings in The Trilogy. The frivolity of a grievance is irrelevant
to its arbitrability because the purpose of arbitration is to resolve a dis-
pute in case-by-case negotiations. Even if the union's position is frivo-
lous, the fact that the union continues to assert its position after the pre-
arbitration steps of the grievance procedure have been exhausted indi-
cates that the dispute remains alive and arbitration is appropriate. 34
The use of arbitration as a strike substitute in grievance negotiation
impasses also requires extremely narrow judicial review of arbitration
awards. As long as the award falls within the broad parameters set forth
in the collective bargaining agreement's generalized code or, in the words
of The Trilogy, as long as the award draws its essence from the agree-
ment, the arbitrator has performed her role as impasse resolver and a
court may not intervene. The parties agreed to substitute binding arbi-
tration for strikes and they receive what they bargained for when the
arbitrator renders an award resolving their dispute. Furthermore,
although the award is final as far as the courts are concerned, it need not
be final for the parties. A party who considers the award to be too erro-
neous can try to correct the error in negotiations with the other party. 35
Consequently, courts give labor arbitrators extremely broad discre-
tion in fashioning their awards. Arbitral fact-finding is completely off
limits to a reviewing court. "[I]mprovident, even silly, factflnding ... is
hardly a sufficient basis for disregarding what the agent appointed by the
parties determined to be the historical facts."'36
Arbitrators have extremely broad discretion in deciding whether,
and to what extent, to consider positive law external to the collective
bargaining agreement in resolving the grievance. An arbitrator may rely
on the doctrine of impossibility of performance to refuse to enforce a
collective bargaining agreement provision violating external law, but
34. As the Court noted in American Mfg., there is generally no exception in the no strike
clause for frivolous grievances. 363 U.S. at 567.
35. The possibility that the parties will nullify an award by mutual agreement appears to
be quite real. One study of reactions to 400 awards in the midwest found that unions sought to
modify the collective bargaining agreement in reaction to the award in more than one of every
five cases, and in 58% of cases involving subcontracting. Donald J. Petersen, Consequences of
the Arbitration Award for Unions, 21 LAB. L.J. 613, 614-15 (1970). Under appropriate circum-
stances, the parties even retain the legal right to nullify an award retroactively. See Strick
Corp., 241 N.L.R.B. 210, 217-20 (1979).
36. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 39 (1987).
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need not do so.37 Arbitrators hold a broad range of views concerning the
appropriateness of considering external law when fashioning grievance
awards.38 Furthermore, when an arbitrator does consider external law in
resolving a grievance, a court may not overturn the award even though
the arbitrator's view of the law was erroneous. 39 United States Court of
Appeals Judge Harry Edwards, a noted labor law scholar and former
arbitrator, has articulated the rationale:
When construction of the contract implicitly or directly requires an
application of "external law," Le., statutory or decisional law, the par-
ties have necessarily bargained for the arbitrator's interpretation of the
law and are bound by it. Since the arbitrator is the "contract reader,"
his interpretation of the law becomes part of the contract and thereby
part of the private law governing the relationship between the parties
to the contract. Thus, the parties may not seek relief from the courts
for an alleged mistake of law by the arbitrator.... The parties' remedy
in such cases is the same remedy they possess whenever they are not
satisfied with the arbitrator's performance of his or her job: negotiate a
modification of the contract or hire a new arbitrator. 4°
The only time that external law may serve as a basis for judicial refusal to
enforce a grievance arbitration award is when the award itself, rather
than the arbitrator's reasoning, creates an express conflict with a well-
defined and dominant public policy as articulated in statutes or judicial
precedent. 41 The narrowness of this public policy review is itself attribu-
table to the role of arbitration as an extension of the collective bargaining
process. 42
If the potential for judicial review provides only minimal constraints
on arbitral discretion, are there any other sources of binding constraints?
It is frequently said that arbitrators apply the "common law of the shop"
in resolving grievances. That is to say, the accumulated decisions of la-
bor arbitrators in thousands of cases over the past half-century have gen-
erated a body of decision-making rules arbitrators may rely upon in
resolving cases. Does the common law of the shop constrain arbitral
37. See W. R. Grace & Co. v. Rubber Workers Local 759, 461 U.S. 757, 767 n.10 (1983).
38. See, e.g., Robert G. Howlett, The Arbitrator, the NLRB and the Courts, in PROC.
20TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 67 (1967); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About
Ideology, Law and Arbitration, in PROC. 20TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. AR. 1 (1967); Rich-
ard Mittenthal, The Role of Law in Arbitration, in PRoC. 21ST ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB.
43 (1968); Michael I. Sovern, When Should Arbitrators Follow Federal Law, in PRoc. 23RD
ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 29 (1970).
39. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Serv., 789 F.2d 1, 6 (D.C.
Cir. 1986).
40. Id.
41. See Misco, 484 U.S. at 42; W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
42. Harry T. Edwards, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: The Clash Between
the Public Policy Exception and the Duty to Bargain, 64 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (1988).
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decision making? And if so, how does it constrain arbitral decision
making?
The common law of the shop is not binding on arbitrators in the
same way that the common law is binding on judges. There is no rule or
principle of stare decisis in grievance arbitration. Although arbitrators
commonly consider prior awards interpreting comparable contract lan-
guage, they are not bound by those awards and frequently assert an obli-
gation to review the issues presented independently. 43 Arbitrators are
not even legally bound to follow prior decisions interpreting the same
contract language between the same parties,44 although most arbitrators
43. See supra note 31. See generally FAIRWEATHER'S PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN
LABOR ARBITRATION 374-77 (Ray J. Schoonhoven ed. 3d ed. 1991) (discussing the influence
of stare decisis in the arbitration process) [herinafter FAIRWEATHER]; Carlton Snow, An Arbi-
trator's Use of Precedent, 94 DICK. L. REV. 665, 672-74 (1990) (same); David E. Feller, Rela-
tionship of the Agreement to External Law, in LABOR ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT: A
HANDBOOK 33, 44-48 (Christopher Barecca et al. eds., 1983) (same) [herinafter LABOR ARBI-
TRATOR DEVELOPMENT].
44. The alleged stare decisis effect of an arbitration award can arise in a variety of con-
texts. First, an employer who won an issue in arbitration may resist arbitration of a subse-
quent grievance raising the identical issue. Courts reject such arguments and order the
employer to arbitration on the subsequent grievance. They reason that the effect of the prior
award is for the arbitrator to decide. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 199 v. United
Tel. Co., 738 F.2d 1564, 1571 (11th Cir. 1984); Little Six Corp. v. United Mine Workers of
Am. Local 8332, 701 F.2d 26, 29 (4th Cir. 1983). The employer's argument is essentially that
the union's claim is frivolous in light of the first arbitration award. Even frivolous grievances
are, however, arbitrable and a court should order the employer to arbitrate. American Mfg.,
363 U.S. at 567.
Second, the union may have won a prior grievance in arbitration and, when an identical
situation arises under the same contract, may seek to rely on the prior award to base an action
in court under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). In
such circumstances, courts hold that the applicability of the prior award to the current situa-
tion is itself a question for the arbitrator and require the union to process its claim through the
grievance procedure. See, eg., Local 1545 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Inland Steel Coal
Co., 876 F.2d 1288, 1296 (7th Cir. 1989); United Paperworkers Int'l Union Local 1206 v.
Georgia Pacific Corp., 798 F.2d 172, 173 (6th Cir. 1986); Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
Int'l Union Local 4-367 v. Rohm & Haas, Texas, Inc., 677 F.2d 492, 495 (5th Cir. 1982);
United Mine Workers Dist. 5 v. Consolidation Coal Co., 666 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1981).
Courts will grant the union's claim only when the prior award, either by its own terms or by
the inherent nature of the award, required the employer to cease and desist similar conduct in
the future. In such cases, the court is not giving stare decisis effect to the prior award in a new
dispute. Rather, it is enforcing the prospective portion of the prior award itself. See Boston
Shipping Ass'n v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n, 659 F.2d 1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1981); Oil,
Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, Local 4-16000 v. Ethyl Corp., 644 F.2d 1044, 1051
(5th Cir. 1981).
Third, two different arbitrators may render conflicting awards under the same contract.
In such instances, courts do not hold that the second arbitrator is bound by the first award.
Rather, the extent to which the first award constrains the second arbitrator is an issue for the
arbitrator and not the court. Grace, 461 U.S. at 764-65; Hotel Ass'n of Washington, D.C. v.




The common law of the shop does not constrain arbitral decision-
making in the way that legal rules and principles may constrain judges.
The primary constraint on arbitral decision-making is the parties them-
selves. The parties can broaden or narrow the arbitrator's discretion
with broad or explicit language in their agreement.46 The parties may
nullify an award by mutual agreement.47 Moreover, the parties select the
arbitrator and through the selection process, unions and employers col-
lectively restrain arbitral discretion.
Parties select arbitrators who they believe will resolve grievances in
a manner consistent with the parties' expectations.4 8 In turn, arbitrators,
conflicting awards were issued by the same arbitrator, Hotel Employees Int'l Union Local 54
v. Adamar, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 795, 797 (D.N.J. 1987), and when the court is presented with
both conflicting awards and each party asks the court to render a definitive interpretation of
the contract. Graphic Arts Int'l Union, Local 97-B v. Haddon Craftsmen, Inc., 489 F. Supp.
1088, 1098 (M.D. Pa. 1979).
Fourth, a court or agency, in resolving an issue of public law, may have to interpret a
collective bargaining agreement's provision which has been the subject of prior arbitration
awards. For example, in Metropolitan Edison Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 478 (3d Cir. 1981),
af'd, 460 U.S. 693 (1983), the company disciplined two union leaders more harshly than it
disciplined other employees, all of whom participated in an illegal strike. The National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB) found that such disparate treatment violated Sections 8(a)(1) and
(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act. Id. at 481 (citing Metropolitan Edison Co., 252
N.L.R.B. 1030 (1980)). In appealing the NLRB's decision, the company argued that the
union, in the collective bargaining agreement, had waived the right of its officers not to be
subject to harsher discipline when the officers failed to use every reasonable effort to end the
illegal strike. Although the contract contained no express language to that effect, the company
relied on two prior arbitration awards that had sustained harsher discipline imposed on union
officers than other employees for failing to make every reasonable effort to end two prior illegal
work stoppages.
The court held that the union had not waived its officers' rights not to be subject to
harsher discipline for participating in illegal work stoppages. Id. at 482-83. It refused to give
the prior awards stare decisis effect, reasoning that arbitration is a dispute resolution process
for specific grievances. Id. at 483-84. The Supreme Court affirmed. 460 U.S. at 693. It im-
plicitly agreed with the Third Circuit's refusal to give prior awards stare decisis effect. It
reasoned that a clear pattern of prior awards coupled with the renegotiation of the contract
and the retention of the same language might evidence an intent to waive the right to equal
disciplinary treatment. Id. at 708-09. It found, however, that two prior awards were insuffi-
cient to establish the waiver in the case before it. Id. at 709.
45. See generally FAIRWEATHER supra note 43 at 377-82 ([A]rbitrators are willing to
follow prior awards even though they might not have rendered the same award if they had
heard the prior case.").
46. For an extreme example of party control, see Ralph Seward, The Special Role of an
Arbitrator in LABOR ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT supra note 43 at 8 (relating a case between
the Steelworkers and a major steel company in which the parties gave the arbitrator two draft
decisions and required him to sign one of the two as his award).
47. See supra note 31.
48. Cf David E. Bloom & Christopher L. Cavanaugh, An Analysis of the Selection of
Arbitrators, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 408 (1986) (study of actual selections of interest arbitrators in
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who want to work again, generally do not disappoint them. Arbitrators
look to prior awards interpreting comparable contract language because
a consistent pattern of prior decisions often provides strong evidence of
the probable expectations of the parties to the dispute before the arbitra-
tor.49 Arbitrators usually apply prior awards between the same parties
because they recognize that, beyond the particular dispute before the ar-
bitrator, the parties expect a strong measure of continuity and consis-
tency in contract administration.50 Thus, the constraints that the
common law of the shop impose on arbitral decision-making are self-
enforcing and do not constrain in the same way as legally binding rules
or principles.
For example, consider the typical collective bargaining agreement's
requirement of just cause for discipline or discharge. It is well estab-
lished in the common law of the shop that the employer has the burden
of proving just cause.51 Arbitrators are not bound, however, by a rule or
principle of law to place the burden of proof on the employer. Although
New Jersey police and firefighter negotiation impasses finding that employers and unions dis-
tinctly prefer some arbitrators to others and that their preferences in picking arbitrators tend
to be moderately similar). Because the parties aim to select arbitrators who are not likely to
decide a case in a manner inconsistent with their expectations, they tend to value an arbitra-
tor's established track record. Consequently, a very small percentage of all arbitrators decide
most of the cases. See Walter J. Primeaux, Jr. & Dalton E. Brannen, Why Few Arbitrators Are
Deemed Acceptable, MoNTHLY LAB. RIv., Sept. 1975, at 29-30.
49. See Roger Abrams, The Nature of the Arbitral Process: Substantive Decision-Making
in Labor Arbitration, 14 U.C. DAvIS L. Rlv. 551, 566-67 (1981).
50. It is common for arbitrators faced with prior awards between the same parties to
disclaim application of the doctrine of stare decisis, maintain that they are not bound by the
awards, but exercise their discretion to follow them to promote stability in labor relations,
judicial economy, and finality in the arbitral process, or to find the prior awards persuasive.
See, e.g., HBI Automotive Glass, 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 121, 127 (1991) (Richard, Arb.); Boise
Cascade Corp., 97 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 8, 12 (1991) (Flagler, Arb.); Safeway Stores, 96 Lab. Arb.
(BNA) 675, 680 (1991) (Cohen, Arb.); North Am. Rayon Corp., 95 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 748, 751
(1990) (Clarke, Arb.); Oberlin College, 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 289, 292 (1989) (Fullmer, Arb.);
Wisconsin Health & Social Servs., 91 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 596, 598 (1988) (Flaten, Arb.); Timken
Co., 88 Lab. Asb. (BNA) 515, 517 (1986) (Morgan, Jr. Arb.); Madison Mutual Ins. Co., 81
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 519, 522 (1983) (Mangeot, Arb.). In some cases, although recognizing the
importance of stability that following prior awards between the same parties promotes, arbitra-
tors have refused to follow them, giving various justifications. See, eg., Fairview Southdale
Hosp., 96 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1129, 1135 (1991) (Flagler, Arb.) (disagreeing with prior award
which found that a benefit became part of the contract as a result of past practice because of
restrictive language of the agreement regarding the maintenance of benefits); Weyerhauser Co.,
92 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 361, 364 (1989) (Woolf, Arb.) (refusing to follow prior award because it
did not contain a full presentation of the arbitrator's reasoning, and opining that "mindless
imposition of an award... may also result in the potential for destabilization"); McQuay-
Perfex, Inc., 93 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 865, 873 (1989) (Bard, Arb.) (refusing to follow prior award
which arbitrator regarded as clearly erroneous).
51. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 23, at 661.
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many reasons were offered to justify placing the burden of proof on the
employer in the early years of the practice's development,5 2 today the
practice is so common that the parties expect the arbitrator to follow it,
usually select an arbitrator who will meet their expectations, and are
rarely disappointed. Indeed, the practice is so common that arbitrators
routinely assume that, by their silence in the agreement with respect to
the burden of proof, the parties have adopted it. There is, however, no
legally binding rule or principle of law that would prevent the parties
from expressly providing that the union bears the burden of proof. Fur-
thermore, an arbitration award upholding a discharge on the ground that
the union failed to prove the absence of just cause would still draw its
essence from the contract and be entitled to judicial enforcement.5 3
Thus, the function of grievance arbitration in collective bargaining's
private system for governing the workplace defines the role of the arbitra-
tor and the role of the court in reviewing arbitration awards. As the
percentage of the workforce governed by this private system continues to
decline, a flood of statutory and judicial regulation is emerging to fill the
resulting void. The question naturally arises whether arbitration can
play the same role in a system of public regulation as it has played in the
collectively bargained system of private regulation.
II. Arbitration of Employment Law Claims
The law of employment arbitration appears to be developing parallel
to the law of labor arbitration. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court established
a broad presumption of arbitrability analogous to the broad presumption
of arbitrability established in The Trilogy. As a condition of employ-
ment, Gilmer signed a uniform securities registration statement requiring
him to arbitrate "any dispute, claim or controversy ... required to be
arbitrated under the rules ... of the organizations with which I regis-
ter."'5 4 Gilmer registered with the New York Stock Exchange, whose
rules compelled arbitration of "any controversy . . . arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of [a] registered representa-
tive."' 55 The Court held that Gilmer was obligated to arbitrate his claim
that his discharge violated the ADEA.
52. See generally Robert H. Gorske, Burden of Proof in Grievance Arbitration, 43 MARQ.
L. REV. 135, 147-48 (1959).
53. See FAIRWEATHER, supra note 43, at 195 (recounting a few rare awards placing bur-
den of proof on the union).
54. 111 S. Ct. at 1650.
55. Id. at 1651.
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The Court, quoting from decisions interpreting the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act5 6 (FAA) in commercial cases, decided that "having made the
bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the
statutory rights at issue."57 The Court placed a burden on Gilmer to
show that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies in
the ADEA.5 8
Gilmer's narrow holding is that an agreement to arbitrate contained
in a securities exchange registration will be enforced with respect to
claims under the ADEA. Its reach, however, raises several issues, in-
cluding the scope of the FAA, and whether in passing particular statutes
Congress intended to preclude arbitration.
Section 1 of the FAA exempts "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce." 59 In Gilmer, the Court expressly reserved the is-
sue of how broadly to construe the FAA's employment contract excep-
tion. The Court concluded that Gilmer's promise to arbitrate was not
found in his employment contract, but in his securities exchange registra-
tion statementA0 The dissent reached the issue, but would have excluded
Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate from the FAA's coverage because of sec-
tion 1.61 The FAA's employment contract exclusion could preclude the
application of Gilmer to the typical employment agreement to arbitrate. 62
Even if the FAA is interpreted not to cover garden variety employ-
ment agreements to arbitrate, state law may still compel their enforce-
ment.63 The early state court response to Gilmer has been favorable
toward arbitration, with several courts relying on its reasoning to compel
arbitration of claims under state employment law.64
56. 9 U.S.C §§ 1-15 (1988).
57. Id, at 1652.
58. Id.
59. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1988).
60. 111 S. Ct. at 1651-52 n.2.
61. Id at 1657 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
62. See Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 948 F.2d 305, 310-11 (6th Cir. 1991) (dicta)
(broadly construing the FAA's employment agreement exclusion); Christine Godsil Cooper,
Where Are We Going with Gilmer?-Some Ruminations on the Arbitration of Discrimination
Claims, 11 ST. L. U. PUB. L. REv. 203, 226-34 (1992) (analyzing the scope of the FAA's
exclusion of employment contracts).
63. For discussions of state law approaches to employment arbitration, see Cooper, supra
note 62, at 223-24; Todd H. Thomas, Using Arbitration to Avoid Litigation, 44 LAB. L.J. 3, 13-
14 (1993).
64. Spellman v. Securities, Annuities & Ins. Servs., 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427, 432-34 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992) (state employment discrimination statute); Skewes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 829
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Regardless of whether state or federal law applies, a key issue will be
whether a particular federal employment statute contains an express dec-
laration by Congress against enforcing predispute agreements to arbi-
trate. The Americans with Disabilities Act65 (ADA) and the Civil
Rights Act of 199166 each contain provisions encouraging the use of arbi-
tration and other ADR techniques. 67 The House Report accompanying
the ADA explained, "[A]ny agreement to submit disputed issues to arbi-
tration, whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in
an employment contract, does not preclude the affected person from
seeking relief under the enforcement provisions of this Act."'68 The
House Report on the Civil Rights Act contained a virtually identical
statement of intent regarding predispute agreements to arbitrate. 69 Nev-
ertheless, courts considering the issue have mechanically applied Gilmer
to enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate Title VII claims. 70
Similarly, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act contains an ex-
press preclusion of waiver of the statute's "rights and procedures."'71
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, relying on Gilmer,
found no congressional intent to preclude enforcement of a predispute
agreement to arbitrate a claim under the act. 72 Thus, the early federal
appellate court reaction to Gilmer suggests that courts will be very reluc-
tant to find a legislative intent to preclude enforcement of predispute
agreements to arbitrate.
Thus, the law of employment arbitration appears to be developing a
broad presumption of arbitrability that will cover virtually all statutory
claims. This presumption of arbitrability appears to parallel the pre-
sumption of arbitrability in The Trilogy. Under the private system of
P.2d 874, 877-78 (Kan. 1992) (state retaliatory discharge tort); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody &
Co., 584 N.Y.S.2d 838, 839-40 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (state human rights act).
65. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12, 12209 (Supp. IV 1992).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Supp. IV 1992).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. IV 1992); Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 118,42 U.S.C. § 1981
(Supp. IV 1992).
68. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 3, at 76-77 (1990). The representative
who suggested the ADR language also clarified, "[U]nder no condition would an arbitration
clause in a collective bargaining agreement or employment contract prevent an individual from
pursuing their rights under the ADA." 136 CONG. REC. H2421-02, 2431 (daily ed. May 17,
1990) (statement of Representative Glickman).
69. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 1, at 97 (1991).
70. Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 307, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1991); Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
71. 29 U.S.C. § 2005(d) (Supp. V 1993).
72. Saari v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 883-84 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 494 (1992).
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collective bargaining, the collective agreement contains the broad princi-
ples governing the workplace. Once the parties have agreed to arbitrate
disputes under that agreement, there is a strong presumption that any
particular dispute is arbitrable and the party resisting arbitration has a
heavy burden of showing in the governing document itself, Le., the col-
lective agreement, that the governing body, Le., the parties, intended to
preclude arbitration.
Similar to collective bargaining agreements, the ADEA at issue in
Gilmer and other employment statutes contain the basic legal rules gov-
erning the workplace. Once the parties have agreed to arbitrate work-
place disputes, there is a strong presumption that any particular dispute
is arbitrable. The party resisting arbitration has a heavy burden of show-
ing in the governing document itself, Le., the statute or its legislative his-
tory, that the governing body, Le., the legislature, intended to preclude
arbitration.73
The governing law of employment arbitration appears to subject
those awards to a very narrow standard of judicial review. Both the
FAA, which will govern if these awards are ultimately held subject to
federal law, and the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA), which will govern
in many states if these awards are subject to state law, provide narrow
grounds for vacating an arbitration award similar to those available
under The Trilogy. Most of the grounds are procedural, such as fraud on
the arbitrator, arbitral partiality, corruption, or failure to give a fair hear-
ing.74 With respect to substantive review, a court will only vacate an
award where it demonstrates a manifest disregard for the law.7 5
73. The apparent parallel to the Court's grievance arbitration jurisprudence is not coinci-
dental. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), is the
first of a series of Supreme Court decisions that lead up to Gilmer. See infra notes 84-89 and
accompanying text. In Mitsubishi, the Court interpreted an agreement to arbitrate any claims
arising out of an automobile dealership contract as a requirement to arbitrate the dealer's
antitrust claims against the manufacturer. The Court cited United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83, and declared that federal policy required
any doubts in interpreting the arbitration clause be resolved in favor of arbitrability. 473 U.S.
at 626. For a critique of the Court's adoption of a presumption of arbitrability outside the
collective bargaining context, see Jonathan R. Nelson, Judge-Made Law and the Presumption
of Arbitrability: David L Threlkeld & Co. v. Metallgesellschaft Ltd., 58 BROOK. L. REv. 279
(1992).
74. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988); Unif. Arb. Act § 12, 7 U.L.A. 140 (1956).
75. See, eg., Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1264 (7th Cir.
1992); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1991);
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (lst Cir. 1990); Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d Cir. 1986); Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469
F.2d 1211, 1213-14 (2d Cir. 1972). Even this narrow standard of review in not available in all
federal circuits. Some courts expressly have declined to review arbitration awards for manifest
disregard of the law. See, eg., Ainsworth v. Skurnick, 960 F.2d 939, 941 (11th Cir. 1992), cert.
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The manifest disregard for the law standard originated in dicta in
Wilko v. Swan, 76 a case in which the Supreme Court refused to compel
arbitration of a claim under the Securities Act of 1933 because of the
narrow standard of judicial review. The Court, however, did not define
"manifest disregard" in its opinion. Lower courts have confined the
standard to instances in which the arbitrator knew what the law was, but
deliberately disregarded it.77
The manifest disregard standard is comparable to The Trilogy's ad-
monition that awards should only be set aside if they fail to draw their
essence from the collective agreement. Both standards confine the re-
viewing court to determining whether the arbitrator did the job for which
the parties contracted, Le., whether the arbitrator interpreted and ap-
plied, rather than disregarded, the private law of the collective bargain-
ing agreement or public law expressed in statutes and court decisions.
As long as the arbitrator did this, courts are not concerned with any
errors in interpretation. 78
In grievance arbitration, the arbitrator serves as an instrument of
workplace self-government. Arbitrators are accountable to the private
parties that appoint them. This accountability is the primary restraint on
how arbitrators apply the privately drafted document that governs the
workplace. Furthermore, when arbitral accountability runs directly to
the parties litigating the grievance, it simultaneously runs to the parties
who negotiated and drafted the governing document under which the
denied, 113 S. Ct 1269 (1993); R. M. Perez & Assoc. v. Welch, 960 F.2d 534, 540 (5th Cir.
1992); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679, 684 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992);
Chameleon Dental Prods. Inc. v. Jackson, 925 F.2d 223, 226 (7th Cir. 1991); Raiford v. Mer-
rill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412-13 (11th Cir. 1990).
76. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989).
77. See, e.g., Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1267 (7th Cir.
1992); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d at 683; Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d at 9; Merrill,
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d at 933. In the employment context,
Professor Cooper has suggested that in a sexual harassment arbitration, an award by an arbi-
trator who mistakenly states that Title VII does not cover sexual harassment would not be
vacated by a court. A court would only overturn an award when the arbitrator stated that she
recognized that Title VII prohibited sexual harassment and imposed liability under the facts
presented, but decided not to find for the plaintiff because she disagreed with the law. Cooper,
supra note 62, at 217.
78. It is not surprising that courts have cited The Trilogy as support for the manifest
disregard standard. See, e.g., Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056, 1060
(9th Cir. 1991); Advest, 914 F.2d at 9. In Advest, the Court compared the "manifest disregard
of the law" standard with the language used in other circuits, ("arbitrary and capricious,"
"completely irrational," "so long as it draws its essence from the underlying agreement") and
concluded that "we regard the standard of review undergirding these various formulations as
identical, no matter how pleochroic their shadings." Id.
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dispute arose. Within this private self-contained system, the role of an
external authority, such as a court, is extremely limited. The Trilogy
properly confined it to ensuring that the arbitrator stays within the pri-
vate system's confines.
A grievance arbitrator may use external statutory law as a tool for
interpreting the collective bargaining agreement. For example, an arbi-
trator interpreting a contractual prohibition on race discrimination may
look to law developed under Title VII. The arbitrator at all times, how-
ever, is interpreting and applying the contract.79 Thus, when an arbitra-
tor misreads statutory law, the apparent errors in legal interpretation
merge with the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract. Because the
parties have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's interpretation of the
contract, they still get what they bargained for and a court should not
release them from their bargain. There is no adverse effect on public
values because the employee's statutory claim is distinct from the griev-
ance and may still be pursued in court.80
Courts applying the FAA outside the labor context have reasoned
by analogy to grievance arbitration in refusing to review arbitral errors of
law. For example, in Northrop Corp. v. Triad International Marketing
S.A.,81 Northrop contracted with Triad to represent it in marketing
Northrop's products and services to the Saudi Arabian Air Force. How-
ever, a Saudi Council of Ministers' decree prohibited payment of com-
missions in connection with arms contracts, and Northrop ceased paying
Triad. Triad brought a claim against Northrop pursuant to the arbitra-
tion clause of their contract.
The contract also contained a choice of law clause which subjected
it to California law. A California statute excused performance of an obli-
gation that is prevented by operation of law. Northrop relied on this
statute in its defense. The arbitrator rejected the defense and issued an
award in Triad's favor.8 2 Northrop sought to vacate the award, arguing
the arbitrator misread California law.
The court, however, refused to review the arbitrator's legal conclu-
sions. It analogized to grievance arbitration cases and reasoned that the
arbitrator's interpretation of California law was necessitated by his duty
to interpret the choice of law clause in the contract. Thus, any errors of
79. See John E. Dunsford, The Role and Function of the Labor Arbitrator, 30 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 109, 122 (1985).
80. McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
81. 811 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914 (1987).
82. 811 F.2d at 1267-68.
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law that the arbitrator may have made were merged into his contractual
interpretation of the choice of law clause. When the parties received the
arbitrator's interpretation, they got exactly what they bargained for and,
absent a manifest disregard for the law, should not be released from their
bargain. 83
The analogy to grievance arbitration drawn in commercial contract
cases such as Northrop cannot be drawn in employment arbitration. The
employee has agreed with the employer to arbitrate any disputes arising
out of the relationship, including statutory claims. The dispute arises
under the statute and the arbitrator is interpreting the statute itself,
rather than merely looking to statutory law as a tool in interpreting the
contract. 84
In employment arbitration, usually the parties or a private agency,
such as the American Arbitration Association, or a securities exchange
appoint the arbitrator. The appointing authority, however, does not co-
incide with the legislative authority. Thus, although arbitrators again are
accountable to the private appointing authority, they are not simultane-
ously accountable to the public authorities responsible for enacting the
law that the arbitrators interpret. Unlike grievance arbitration in which
a privately accountable arbitrator interprets and applies privately devel-
oped law, employment arbitration substitutes a privately accountable ar-
bitrator, for a publicly accountable judge or administrative agency, to
interpret and apply public law. Consequently, The Trilogy's rationale of
preserving a private system of workplace self-government cannot justify
the similarly limited judicial role in overseeing employment arbitration.
Indeed, the lack of arbitral public accountability initially led the
Supreme Court to deny enforcement of predispute agreements to arbi-
trate statutory claims. In Wilko v. Swan,85 the Court held that a predis-
pute arbitration agreement did not compel arbitration of a claim under
the Securities Act of 1933. The Court expressed concern that arbitration
would short circuit the judicial role in protecting the public values under-
lying the statute. It observed that the arbitration awards could be issued
without an explanation of reasons and without a complete record of the
proceeding, and that substantive judicial review would be limited to
awards reflecting a manifest disregard for the law. 86
83. Id. at 1269.
84. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 647-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing between
contractual rights and independent statutory rights).
85. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Ex-
press, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
86. Id. at 436-37. Justices Frankfurter and Minton dissented, but agreed that protection
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During the 1980s, the Court abandoned the concerns that it had
expressed in Wilko regarding the absence of arbitrator accountability. In
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,87 the Court
held that a United States automobile dealer was obligated by its franchise
agreement with a Japanese manufacturer to arbitrate its claims under the
antitrust laws. The Court regarded the arbitration agreement as not for-
going the dealer's statutory rights, but merely opting out of the judicial
system and into an arbitral forum. It justified the change of forum as
trading "the procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for
the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitration.188 The Court
considered the availability of judicial review at the enforcement stage of
the arbitration as sufficient to preserve the public interests underlying the
statute. It made clear, however, that such review would be limited to
whether "the tribunal took cognizance of the antitrust claims and actu-
ally decided them." 89
Two years after Mitsubishi, the Court relied on that decision to en-
force predispute agreements to arbitrate claims under RICO90 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.91 Two years later, it formally over-
ruled Wilko.92 These cases enabled the Court in Gilmer to regard its
holding compelling arbitration of ADEA claims as a logical extension of
its developing jurisprudence involving the arbitration of statutory
claims.93
Gilmer thus represents the Supreme Court's endorsement of delegat-
ing the interpretation of public law to privately accountable adjudicators
subject only to minimal oversight by the judiciary. The justification for
employment arbitration is thus the same as for other types of ADR-
speed, informality, and cost-effectiveness-rather than the promotion of
a private system of workplace self-government. Furthermore, it is pre-
sumed that arbitration will further the public interest by reducing over-
crowded judicial and administrative dockets. 94
of public values underlying the statute required an arbitral record or opinion assuring that the
arbitrator complied with the underlying law. Id. at 440 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
87. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
88. Id. at 628.
89. Id. at 638.
90. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988).
91. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77-78 (1988). Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S.
220 (1987).
92. Rodrigues de Quejas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
93. See Gilmer, II1 S. Ct. at 1652.
94. Whether arbitration and other ADR techniques actually result in more efficient dis-
pute resolution has been the subject of considerable debate. Compare Thomas D. Lambros,
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A New Adversarial Model for a New Era, 50 U. PITr. L.
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Both those who hail and those who dread the growing ADR move-
ment recognize that there is a tension between speedy, efficient dispute
resolution and publicly accountable lawmaking. ADR opponents main-
tain that gains in efficiency, if any, cannot justify what they decry as the
privatization of public justice.95 ADR proponents minimize the public
justice concerns and maintain that without ADR's efficiency gains there
will be no justice at all, only judicial and administrative gridlock.96 Some
have sought to resolve this seemingly insolvable debate by supporting
ADR generally, while carving out certain types of cases heavily laden
with public value choices and requiring that those be litigated in a public
forum.97 This Article looks to jurisprudential theory to resolve the
debate.
IV. Jurisprudential Views of Constraints on Adjudicators
Concerns over the privatization of justice through employment arbi-
tration are fueled by the employment arbitrator's accountability only to
private appointing authorities, in contrast to the labor arbitrator who is
accountable to the very authorities who enacted the standards that the
REV. 789, 795 (1989) (proposing the summary jury trial as an effective ADR technique to
reduce burdens on the judicial system); A. ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION
OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 93 (1988) (not-
ing the results of their evaluation showed "arbitration rules have expedited the disposition of
cases"); A. Leo Levin & Deirdre Golash, Alternate Dispute Resolution in Federal District
Courts, 37 U. FLA. L. REV. 29, 59 (1985) (noting that "it is too early to make definitive
judgments concerning" the general speed of arbitration in relation to litigation); and BARBARA
S. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT COURTS 109 (1990)
("Arbitration programs can, but do not always, reduce disposition time.") with Kim Dayton,
The Myth of Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 76 IOWA L. REV. 889, 957
(1991) ("[Flor more than a decade, advocates of ADR have successfully met challenges of
every description with the argument that ADR is both cost- and time-efficient ... [but] the
statistics simply do not support the claims.") and Deborah R. Hansler, Court-Ordered Arbitra-
tion: An Alternative View, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 399, 406-15 (arguing "court-ordered arbi-
tration produces mixed results with regards to efficiency").
95. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Judith Resnick,
Due Process: A Public Dimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405 (1987); Diane P. Wood, Court-
Annexed Arbitration: The Wrong Cure, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 421, 445-51.
96. See, e.g., Arthur Eliot Berkeley & E. Patrick McDermott, The Second Golden Age of
Employment Arbitration, 43 LAB. L.J. 774, 778 (1992); C. Edward Fletcher, III, Privatizing of
Securities Disputes Through the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements, 71 MINN. L. REV.
393, 458 (1987); Evan J. Spelfogel, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Deferral to Arbitration, 6
LAB. LAW. 87, 95 (1990).
97. See, e.g., Robert A. Baruch Brush, Dispute Resolution Alternatives and the Goals of
Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984 Wis. L. REV. 893, 899-91;
Cooper, supra note 62, at 241; Edwards, Panacea or Anathema?, supra note 12, at 671-72; Leo
Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration Experience,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 239, 244-50 (1987).
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arbitrator must apply. In other words, in employment arbitration the
applicable law is public but the arbitrator's accountability is private.
This raises substantial questions concerning the legitimate constraints on
employment arbitrators. To whom are they ultimately accountable?
What general standards of justice should they apply when interpreting
employment statutes? What standards should courts use in reviewing
employment arbitrators' decisions?
This Section reviews the implications of several Well-known juris-
prudential theories of the nature of law. It suggests that all adjudication
presupposes ethical constraints grounded in what may be termed a moral
minimalist conception of natural law. Considered in itself moral
minimalism does not, however, significantly limit adjudicators' discretion
in deciding particular cases. For this reason, it is necessary to supple-
ment the moral minimalist conception of natural law to produce a useful
account of the ethical responsibilities corresponding to the adjudicatory
role. Accordingly, this Article reviews three jurisprudential theories:
Legal Realism, H.L.A. Hart's version of Legal Positivism, and Ronald
Dworkin's conception of Law as Integrity. These accounts of the nature
of law implicitly or explicitly contain theories of the ethical constraints
on the adjudicatory role.
Justice Benjamin Cardozo aptly described the issues that any adjudi-
cator faces in resolving issues of law:
What is it that I do when I decide a case? To what sources of informa-
tion do I appeal for guidance? In what proportions do I permit them
to contribute to the result? In what proportions ought they to contrib-
ute? If a precedent is applicable, when do I refuse to follow it? If no
precedent is applicable, how do I reach the rule that will make a prece-
dent for the future? If I am seeking logical consistency, the symmetry
of the legal structure, how far shall I seek it? At what-point shall the
quest be halted by some discrepant custom, by some consideration of
the social welfare, by my own or the common standards of justice and
morals?98
This section proposes an intellectual framework in which to organ-
ize thought about the issues Justice Cardozo raised based upon a "mini-
malist" version of the theory of natural law. The writings of Thomas
Hobbes contain the most detailed and philosophically influential state-
ment of natural law theory.99 Hobbes's Leviathan elucidated the princi-
pal characteristics of the law of nature.100 Hobbes initially defined a law
98. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 10 (1921).
99. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier MacMillan Pub-
lishers 1962) (1651); THOMAS HOBBES, The Citizen, in MAN AND CITIZEN (Bernard Gert ed.,
1972) (1642).
100. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 99, at 103-24.
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of nature as a "precept, or general rule of reason."' 01 He then enumer-
ated all of the specific rules he believed satisfied this characterization, and
explained common sense rationales for each of them that, presumably,
every rational person could understand. Hobbes stated the sum and sub-
stance of the basic laws of nature in the following simple rule "intelligi-
ble, to even the meanest capacity": "Do not that to another, which thou
wouldest not have done to thyself."10 2 In light of this summary statement
of the laws of nature, Hobbes called the science of these laws "the true
moral philosophy."'' 0 3
According to Hobbes, all individuals recognize, insofar as they are
rational, that human beings tend to have certain characteristics drawing
them into mutually destructive violent conflict that produces a dreadful
condition, which he described in memorable terms as a "war of all
against all.'104 Hobbes argued, however, that society can avoid falling
into this condition if individuals act in accordance with the rules con-
tained in the laws of nature.'05
Hobbes's writings presented a minimalist view of natural law.
Although Hobbes believed in the existence of a law of nature grounded in
reason and understandable to and binding upon all rational human be-
ings, he also believed that deep, bitter, and potentially violent disagree-
ment could arise over its interpretation in specific circumstances when
individuals consider their vital interests at stake. For this reason, he
viewed a principal function of government as providing a public interpre-
tation of the laws of nature through enactment of what he termed "civil
law," consisting of the commands of the sovereign authority. 10 6
Thus, Hobbes distinguished between general precepts of the natural
law, acknowledged by all rational human beings, and the often bitterly
divergent interpretations of those precepts in concrete circumstances. In
this respect, his views coincide with an outlook the contemporary polit-
ical philosopher Michael Walzer has recently termed "moral
minimalism."10 7
According to moral minimalism, morality has two components.
The first is a set of broad principles, widely agreed upon in almost every
human society. These principles are, however, so broad and general that
101. Id. at 103.
102. Id. at 122 (emphasis in original).
103. Id. at 123.
104. Id. at 100.
105. HOBBES, The Citizen, supra note 99, at 123.
106. Id. at 178.
107. Michael Walzer, Moral Minimalism, in FROM THE TWILIGHT OF PROBABILITY:
ETHICS AND POLITICS 3 (William R. Shea and Antonio Spadafora eds., 1992).
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they provide only minimal guidance for resolving the controversial and
complex moral issues about which individuals and social groups deeply
disagree. For this reason, moral minimalism points to a second compo-
nent of morality, consisting of more determinate, but far less widely
agreed upon, principles reflecting diverse interpretations of the broad,
widely agreed upon "minimal" principles of morality. The diversity in
interpretation results from differences on matters of importance to indi-
viduals and social groups, such as religion, politics, economics, cultural
traditions, and personal outlooks on life.
For example, Walzer considers justice to be a universally valued
goal, but one that is subject to diverse interpretations. For example,
when presented with the statement in Deuteronomy, "Justice, justice
shalt thou pursue,"108 most people would agree. 109 If, however, they
were presented with a detailed account of how the Deuteronomist actu-
ally understood the idea of justice, most people today would disagree.
They would prefer a more general or flexible conception of justice and
might view the Deteuronomist's conception as "so distant and alien as to
leave them entirely unresponsive."110
Hobbes's laws of nature closely correspond to minimal morality in
Walzer's sense (i e., to the idea of a set of broad principles, widely agreed
upon, but often subject to deep and bitter disagreements over their inter-
pretation in particular circumstances). The fact of such disagreement
does not, however, make the laws of nature morally irrelevant or trivial.
In Walzer's words:
I want to stress ... that "minimalism" does not describe a morality
that is substantively minor or emotionally shallow. The opposite is
more likely true: this is morality close to the bone. There isn't much
that is more important than "truth" and "justice" minimally
understood. 11
Under the moral minimalist version of natural law theory, a judge
has two fundamental duties. First, she must apply the civil law fairly, so
that all of the parties in a given case receive their due under the law. 1 2
Second, if a case presents an issue of interpretation in regard to a particu-
lar law, the judge must make every effort to interpret the law in a way
that results in a just decision. In other words, the judge must make a
decision allowing one reasonably to view the law itself as just, and to
108. Deuteronomy 16:20.
109. "[T]he [general] idea of justice... appears... in every human society." Walzer,
supra note 107, at 5-6.
110. Id.
111. Id. at6.
112. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN, supra note 99, at 120-21.
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view the law as justly applied in the circumstances of the case.11 3 How-
ever, the moral minimalist version of natural law theory has little to say
about the relevant standards of justice upon which a judge should rely to
fulfill this second duty.
Various jurisprudential theories address this critical issue raised, but
not settled, by the moral minimalist version of natural law theory. Ac-
cording to one view, the body of judicial opinion rendered by judges in
prior cases provides the appropriate standard of justice a judge should
follow when issues of legal interpretation arise in a given case. 114 The
notion that precedent can provide judges with a genuine guide to deci-
sionmaking, however, has come under strong criticism, especially from
legal realists such as Karl Llewelyn. I15 Llewelyn and other legal realists
have argued that any moderately complex case presents a range of prece-
dents, each leading to a different decision. The question then becomes
not whether to follow precedent, but which precedent to follow.
Furthermore, Llewelyn maintained that a skillful and clever judge
can almost always fashion equally persuasive arguments for and against
the application of a given precedent. 1 6 Statutes, in the realist view, also
fail to provide genuine guidance for judicial decision. With enough intel-
lectual ingenuity, say the realists, a judge can construct equally respecta-
ble arguments for and against the application of statutory language in
any particular case.' 17 The legal realists thus maintained that the stan-
dards of justice a judge employs emanate not from the law itself, but
from the judge's personal viewpoints, combining such diverse elements as
her cultural background, political and ethical beliefs, and individual psy-
113. Id. at 208-09.
114. For traditional formulations of this view, see SIR EDWARD COKE, 1 INSTITUTES
§ 138 (1629); SIR MATTHEW HALE, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW (Charles M. Gray
ed., 1971); SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 17-20,
67 (1629). Hobbes criticized the traditional defense of common-law precedent as a standard of
justice in THOMAS HOBBES, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER AND STUDENT OF THE
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND (Joseph Cropsey ed., 1971) (1794). For Hale's response, see Sir
Matthew Hale, Reflections by the Lord Chief Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes, His Dialogue on the
Law, in A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 499 (Sir William Holdsworth ed., 1956) (1681). Ben-
tham and Hume also defended precedent, but did so on different bases than Coke, Hale, and
Blackstone. See JEREMY BENTHAM, A COMMENT ON THE COMMENTARIES AND A FRAG-
MENT ON GOVERNMENT (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1977) (1823); DAVID HUME, EN-
QUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS (P.H. Nidditch ed., 1975) (1751). For a
discussion of the two defenses of precedent, see Gerald J. Postema, Roots of Our Notion of
Precedent, in PRECEDENT IN LAW 9 (Lawrence Goldstein ed., 1987).
115. See KARL LLEWELYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (Oceana Publications, 1989) (1930).
116. Id. at 74-75, 81-82.
117. Id. at 84-85.
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chology.118 Thus, to the realists, the true law is limited to the judge's
decision in any particular case.
This outlook poses major problems concerning the legitimacy of ju-
dicial authority. Everyone may have opinions about the rights and duties
of others. A judge's opinions on these matters, as rendered in a judicial
decision, are, however, generally thought to have two distinctive charac-
teristics. First, individuals before a court are assumed to have a duty to
make the judge's opinion their own standard of conduct. Second, most
individuals generally regard the use of governmental power to enforce
the judge's opinion as morally justifiable. These two salient characteris-
tics of a judge's opinions concerning rights and duties in society are
bound up in a crucial way with the judge's role as a public official who
applies public, rather than purely personal, standards of justice to decide
cases.
Legal realism leads, however, to one of the following two conclu-
sions. Either legitimate judicial authority simply does not exist, or it ex-
ists, but does not, as widely supposed, depend on a judge's duty to apply
public rather than personal standards of justice. Each of these proposi-
tions poses large and difficult questions.
On the one hand, if legitimate judicial authority does not exist, there
can be no basic moral duty to obey the judgments of a court, and no basic
moral justification for their enforcement through the instruments of gov-
ernmental power. To the extent that such a moral duty or justification
exists in particular circumstances, it follows as a logical consequence of
other independent moral duties or justifying circumstances. For some
people, this sweeping and radical conclusion may produce a sense of in-
tellectual excitement, but most individuals would reject it as far too
extreme.
On the other hand, if legitimate judicial authority does not depend
on a judge's duty to apply public standards of justice, one is hard put to
say what legitimate judicial authority means or could mean. The prob-
lem here does not stem from the often highly subjective nature of per-
sonal views concerning standards of justice and their application in
concrete circumstances. Even if a judge's personal views on justice, as
applied to a particular case, are objectively correct (however one chooses
to understand the idea of objective correctness in this context), to the
extent a judge bases her decision solely upon her personal views of jus-
tice, she has applied her personal law. This, in turn, raises the questions
of why anyone should regard themselves as having a duty to comply with
118. Id. at 81.
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her personal law, and of why anyone should consider the use of govern-
mental power to enforce her personal law as morally justified.' 19
A person thus faces a choice between two highly problematic view-
points as a logical consequence of accepting legal realism. Legal posi-
tivists, such as H.L.A. Hart, have tried to avoid this dilemma by
rejecting the central ideas of legal realism. Hart acknowledged that
"[flact situations do not await us neatly creased and folded," and "their
legal classification [is not] written on them to be simply read off by the
judge.'12° For Hart it is, however, a long leap from these points to
Llewelyn's claim that a skillful and clever judge can always fashion
equally persuasive arguments for any stance on whether a given case falls
under a certain statutory provision, or whether a particular precedent
applies.
According to Hart, all legal systems require compromise between
certainty and flexibility. On the one hand, many of the rules of a legal
system must be capable of application by most individuals over large ar-
eas of conduct. On the other hand, the rules of the system "need to leave
open, for later settlement by an informed official choice, issues which can
only be properly appreciated and settled when they arise in a concrete
case."' 12 Hart observed that modern legal systems typically effect this
compromise through a variety of methods depending on implicit judg-
ments concerning ability to anticipate the future in different areas of so-
cial life. Legislatures, according to Hart, provide for future application
of statutes in two ways. First, they enact general standards and imple-
ment the standards by delegating rule-making authority to an adminis-
trative body.' 22 Second, when a legislature believes that future
circumstances, although varied, will encompass familiar features of expe-
rience, it leaves application of the statutes to courts to judge what is
reasonable. 123
Hart contrasted these two techniques with statutes that successfully
regulate conduct by delineating specific requirements of action. Accord-
ing to Hart, under these circumstances, "certain distinguishable actions,
events, or states of affairs are of such practical importance to us, as things
either to avert or bring about, that very few concomitant circumstances
119. As some scholars have observed, none of the eminent Legal Realists ever systemati-
cally explored the ethical implications of their positions with respect to the legitimacy of judi-
cial decisions. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 5-7 (1977).
120. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV.
593, 607 (1958).
121. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127 (1961).
122. Id. at 127-28.
123. Id. at 128-29.
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incline us to regard them differently. ' 124 Legal regulation of conduct
through statute presupposes that general words in a language have stan-
dard instances "in which no doubts are felt about [their] application. ' 125
Accordingly, in Hart's view, one can distinguish between the "core of
settled meaning" associated with a particular statutory provision, and the
"penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither absolutely ap-
plicable nor obviously ruled out.1 26 Hart maintained that a statute's
core area of settled meaning increases over time through judicial reliance
upon precedent. Hart conceded the legal realists' point that "there is no
single method of determining the rule for which a given authoritative
precedent is an authority."1 27 He also recognized that judges may nar-
row and widen the rules enunciated in prior cases. Hart insisted, how-
ever, that even when one takes these points into account, judicial
adherence to precedent can produce "a body of rules of which a vast
number... are as determinate as any statutory rule." 128 According to
Hart, a responsible judge has a choice about standards of justice only on
issues lying within the penumbral zone, in which core meanings of statu-
tory terms and rules laid down in prior cases no longer provide determi-
nate guidance for decision.
In Law's Empire, Ronald Dworkin proposed an account of the judi-
cial role occupying a middle ground between legal realism and Hart's
version of legal positivism. 1 29 Dworkin recognized a large element of
choice in judicial decision making. He argued, however, that a responsi-
ble judge is not constrained by a duty to apply core statutory meanings
and to follow precedent. Rather, a responsible judge has a duty to ap-
proach cases in a way consistent with what Dworkin called "law as
integrity."
To explain the idea of law as integrity, Dworkin drew an analogy
between judging and literary criticism. 130 Judges and literary critics
alike deal with texts whose overall meanings are substantially under-
determined by their exact words. For this reason, both judges and liter-
ary critics confront problems of interpretation that call for a theoretical
approach which brings a diversity of elements to one's understanding of
a text, such as history, philosophy, politics, religion, and psychology.
Dworkin observed, however, that the analogy between judging and liter-
124. Id. at 130.
125. Hart, supra note 120, at 607.
126. Id.
127. HART, supra note 121, at 131.
128. Id. at 132.
129. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
130. Id. at 94-96.
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ary criticism breaks down in a crucial respect. The judge not only inter-
prets law, but also makes it. 131 A judge's interpretation of the body of
law in a jurisdiction, as it applies to a particular case, becomes part of
that body of law for judges to interpret in the future. As a result, the
judge is like a critic, but like an author as well.
Dworkin further developed the analogy between judging and liter-
ary activity through an imaginary genre, which he called the chain
novel. 132 In a chain novel, a number of different authors write its chap-
ters one after another. In this respect, chain novels resemble television
soap operas and story games played around a campfire. Unlike soap op-
eras and story games, however, each of the authors of a chain novel takes
the enterprise seriously. Chain novelists view themselves as responsible
to continue the novel, at the respective points that they begin writing, in
a way that makes the novel the best it can be as a literary work.
Continuing a chain novel thus requires an author to develop a con-
ception of how the novel, as written up to a given point, hangs together
and how its elements, such as plot, development of character, narrative
style, imagery, and symbolism, cohere with one another. Such a concep-
tion, in turn, depends on developing an overall interpretation of the
novel, of its main themes and underlying aesthetic structure. Dworkin
observed that overall interpretations of a novel have two dimensions of
evaluation. 133
The first dimension concerns how well hypotheses about theme and
aesthetic structure harmonize and make sense of the novel so that the
chain novelist can continue it in a way that makes it the best it can be. 134
The second dimension concerns the chain novelist's independent artistic
judgments, as determined, among other ways, by her outlook on life and
personal values.1 35 In some cases, two or more interpretations may ap-
pear to fit the novel equally well, and so the chain novelist, taking seri-
ously the charge to help make the novel the best it can be, proceeds from
the standpoint of her independent aesthetic outlook. 136
Dworkin conceived of the judicial role by analogy to the chain
novel. According to Dworkin, judges should "identify legal rights and
duties, so far as possible, on the assumption that they were all created by
a single author-the community personified-expressing a coherent con-
131. Id. at 229.
132. Id. at 229.
133. Id. at 230-31.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 231.
136. Id.
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ception of justice and fairness."' 137 As with the chain novelist, ideally
speaking, a judge brings an interpretive theory to the adjudication of
cases in order to further the development of the law and make it the best
it can be. Furthermore, as with chain novels, such a theory can be evalu-
ated from two standpoints. The first concerns the degree to which an
interpretive theory effects coherence among the diverse sources of law
such as statutes and case law. The second standpoint comes into play
when considerations of fit cannot discriminate between two or more in-
terpretations of a statute or line of cases. 138
Judicial reasoning, according to Dworkin's account, thus accords an
important role to the independent judgment of judges. This role, how-
ever, is limited by a responsibility to decide cases from the standpoint of
a particular kind of intellectual approach. This approach aims to dis-
cover coherence among the diverse sources of law, including precedent,
and to bring them to bear upon cases in a way that promotes develop-
ment of the law toward the best it can be. According to Dworkin, the
duty of a judge in a given case cannot be analyzed as following precedent,
if one interprets this to mean reaching the result absolutely demanded by
prior case law. The law makes no such absolute demands. 139 For Dwor-
kin, judges fulfill their duty by adopting the standpoint of law as integ-
rity, ie., by "trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about
people's rights and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the
political structure and legal doctrine of the community." 4° Law as in-
tegrity thus requires a judge "to test his interpretation of any part of the
great network of political structures and decisions of his community by
asking whether it could form part of a coherent theory justifying the net-
work as a whole."' 141
The foregoing discussion of Legal Realism, H.L.A. Hart's version of
Legal Positivism, and Ronald Dworkin's conception of Law as Integrity
has been truncated in a key respect. Each of these theories addresses
issues besides those associated with the adjudicatory role raised by Jus-
tice Cardozo. Most important, however, each theory explicitly or implic-
itly addresses the legitimacy of adjudicatory authority; each theory
addresses why an adjudicator acting under color of legal authority has a
moral right to decide issues for others, and why persons subject to those
decisions have a duty to regard them as binding. Furthermore, answers
137. Id at 225.
138. Id. at 239.
139. Id at 122.
140. Id at 255.
141. Id at 245.
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or assumptions within a jurisprudential theory concerning the nature of
legitimate adjudicatory authority affect, although they do not always
uniquely determine, the account of the adjudicatory role within that
theory. 142
The next section returns to the issues concerning privatization of
justice raised by the Gilmer case and engages in a type of intellectual
"transplant operation." The accounts of the adjudicatory role discussed
in this section will be removed from their traditional theoretical contexts
and applied to the significantly different circumstances of labor and em-
ployment arbitration.
V. A Proposed Jurisprudence of Labor and Employment
Arbitration
The preceding discussion of competing jurisprudential theories of
the constraints on judges allows a return to questions about legitimate
constraints on arbitral decision-making. In this regard, it is helpful to
note the following two sets of distinctions.
First, jurisprudential theories of the adjudicatory role, such as Legal
Realism, H.L.A. Hart's version of Legal Positivism, and Ronald Dwor-
kin's conception of Law as Integrity, have both a normative and a de-
scriptive dimension. Normatively, these theories provide general
accounts of the approach a person occupying an adjudicatory role ought
to adopt in her efforts to reach a just decision when interpreting the law.
From a descriptive standpoint, one assesses the plausibility of jurispru-
dential theories about the adjudicatory role in terms of their consistency
with what one might term "best adjudicatory practice." Here, one as-
sumes the possibility of identifying, apart from any prior jurisprudential
theory, at least a number of clear-cut instances in which an adjudicator
has rendered a just decision under circumstances presenting significant
interpretive problems. A theory of the adjudicatory role must pass the
descriptive test of consistency with such clear-cut examples.
Second, from either a normative or a descriptive standpoint, an ade-
quate theory of the adjudicatory role analyzes two critical factors termed
respectively "personal" and "institutional" constraints on an adjudica-
tor. Personal constraints concern an adjudicator's beliefs about factors
that in her opinion limit her degrees of freedom in deciding cases. In all
likelihood these beliefs will encompass a wide range of factors, including
ethical, social, and economic considerations. In contrast, institutional
constraints pertain not to an adjudicator's beliefs, but rather to self-en-
142. See Postema, supra note 114, at 9-34.
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forcing elements within a system of adjudication that impose limits on an
adjudicator's range of discretion. These primarily include bases of juris-
diction and provisions relating to review of the adjudicator's decision by
higher authorities within the system.
Accordingly, the analysis proceeds to the key jurisprudential ques-
tion: What are the personal and the institutional constraints that apply
to arbitration? An acceptable answer to this question must provide a
convincing analysis of the personal and institutional constraints that
ought to apply to arbitrators. Furthermore, the answer must be consis-
tent with views of the personal and institutional constraints that bind
arbitrators embodied in clearly identifiable best arbitration practice. In
dealing with the key jurisprudential question, we will look first at labor
arbitration under collective bargaining agreements, and then turn our at-
tention to arbitration of statutory claims under agreements to arbitrate
between employers and employees, of the kind that figured in Gilmer.
A. Labor Arbitration
Collective bargaining agreements do not establish traditional com-
mon-law contract rights. Rather, they provide a code of very broad gen-
eralized principles governing the workplace. These principles take on
meaning only as applied to specific situations, and the parties defer their
refinement to case-by-case negotiation through the grievance procedure.
When the parties are unable to reach agreement in a particular case, they
submit their dispute to an arbitrator. The range of resolutions available
to the arbitrator is limited only by the parties-by what they provided in
the collective bargaining agreement and by what they choose to give the
arbitrator by way of evidence and argument.
Legal Realism provides the best theory of the adjudicatory role for
answering the key jurisprudential question as it relates to labor arbitra-
tion under collective bargaining agreements. Legal Realism accounts for
the personal and institutional constraints upon labor arbitrators, both
normatively and descriptively, in a far more plausible way than do the
other leading jurisprudential theories of the adjudicatory role.
Under a Legal Realist account, the personal constraints on a labor
arbitrator are minimal from both normative and descriptive standpoints.
In this regard, the Legal Realist account holds that an arbitrator may
draw heavily upon her personal views concerning justice in the work-
place, reflecting her individual outlook on factual matters, her sense of
ethics, and her views on social policy. To the extent any personal con-
straints bind a labor arbitrator, they concern her beliefs in regard to the
general expectations of the parties as to the broad principles she will ap-
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ply in resolving the case at hand. Correspondingly, a Legal Realist ac-
count implies extremely weak institutional constraints on labor
arbitrators. Under this view, courts should treat the decisions of labor
arbitrators as unreviewable except within a narrow range of circum-
stances in which the arbitrator's award completely disregards the terms
of the applicable collective bargaining agreement.
With respect to personal constraints, Legal Realism views the stan-
dards of justice employed by an adjudicator as emanating from her per-
sonal viewpoint, shaped by her background, psychological makeup, and
outlook on life. For this reason, as discussed in Part IV, the Legal Real-
ist view of the judicial process raises serious questions of legitimacy. Ju-
dicial reliance on personal rather than public standards of justice in
interpreting, applying, and shaping public law calls into question the
moral authority and the binding nature of judicial decisions. No such
problem of legitimacy exists, however, when the Legal Realist model is
applied to the labor arbitration process because the labor arbitrator does
not interpret, apply, or shape public law. The labor arbitrator is a pri-
vate adjudicator in a system of private law. The parties confer on the
arbitrator a legitimacy to apply her personal standards of justice to the
collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator is the parties' designated
interpreter of the agreement. When the arbitrator applies her personal
standards of justice the parties receive exactly what they bargained for, as
long as she stays within the range of options arguably available to her
under the agreement.
Some legal realists implicitly recognize the potential legitimacy
problems raised by their view of the judicial process. They limit the
binding nature of any judicial decision to the actual litigants. The prece-
dential value of case law lies in its utility as a predictor of what a judge
may do in a future case. Truly binding law is, however, "what ... offi-
cials do about disputes." 143
Regardless of whether this view appropriately describes the essence
of law,144 it clearly applies to labor arbitration. Because the function of
the labor arbitrator is to resolve the negotiation impasse in a particular
grievance, the arbitrator's award is not legally binding beyond that griev-
ance. Awards do not have stare decisis precedential effects unless the
parties expressly provide for that. 145 Adapting Llewelyn's words, "This
143. LLEWELYN, supra note 115, at 12.
144. Llewelyn himself retreated from it somewhat after the first edition of his book. Id. at
ix.
145. See supra notes 40- 44 and accompanying text. The absence of stare decisis preceden-
tial effects of prior awards is directly related to the parties' conferral on the selected arbitrator
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doing of something about disputes, this doing it reasonably, is the busi-
ness of"'1 4 6 labor arbitration.
With respect to the institutional constraints upon labor arbitrators,
judicial deference to grievance arbitration awards promotes peaceful col-
lective bargaining as the primary form of workplace self-government.
The broad standard of deference facilitates the parties' ability to defer
most workplace disputes to case-by-case negotiations through the griev-
ance procedure. 147 This process, in turn, facilitates the parties' ability to
conclude collective bargaining agreements without resort to strikes or
other economic weaponry. Moreover, by broadly enforcing arbitration
awards, courts give effect to arbitration as the parties' tool for resolving
impasses in grievance negotiations, thereby ensuring labor peace during
the term of the collective agreement.
Under a Legal Realist model, the private law of the collective bar-
gaining agreement is the arbitrator's resolution of the particular dispute,
which is exactly what the parties bargained for. Therefore, arbitral deci-
sions should be enforced by a court or deferred to by an administrative
agency. The legitimacy of judicial deference to grievance arbitration
awards thus stems from the private nature of the collective bargaining
process. Because the collective bargaining agreement is a private gov-
erning document and grievance arbitration is a private adjudication pro-
cess, the system itself is directly accountable to the parties who control it.
The only public concerns implicated by the results of this private, self-
contained system arise when the arbitrator clearly exceeds the system's
boundaries and when the result of the system clearly contravenes a well-
defined and dominant public policy.
The consequences of conflicting arbitration awards illustrates the
absence of public concern with the operation of the private system of
workplace government. Assume that the same union has collective bar-
gaining agreements with two different companies and that the agree-
of authority and responsibility to apply her standards of workplace justice to resolve their
particular grievance. Were she to give stare decisis effect to awards of other arbitrators, partic-
ularly in cases arising under other contracts, she would abdicate her responsibility. As one
leading arbitrator has explained:
While an opinion of another arbitrator, in an unrelated bargaining relationship,
sometimes may be useful in suggesting possible approaches to a difficult interpretive
question, the inescapable fact is that the parties agree in any given case only to accept
the judgment of the arbitrator whom they have selected-they grant no commission
to apply some other individual's judgment.
Sylvester Garrett, The Interpretive Process: Myths and Reality, 38TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L
ACAD. ARB. 121, 144 (1986).
146. LLEWELYN, supra note 115, at 3.
147. See supra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
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ments contain identical language requiring just cause for discharge.
Each company fires an employee with ten years of seniority and a rela-
tively good work record because of excessive absenteeism. Each com-
pany has a no-fault attendance program under which employees are
charged demerit points for each lateness or unpaid absence, regardless of
the reason. After three points the employee is reprimanded, after five
points the employee is suspended, and after seven points the employee is
terminated. Both fired employees had very good attendance records dur-
ing most of their tenure. Both, however, became ill, exhausted their paid
sick leave, accumulated seven points, and were dismissed. The union
grieved both discharges, was unable to settle either, and proceeded to
arbitration before two different arbitrators.
The union's grievance against Company One came before Arbitrator
A. Arbitrator A sustained the grievance, concluding that under these
circumstances the discharge lacked just cause because the employee was
not at fault in being absent and could be expected to return to an accepta-
ble level of attendance upon physical recovery.
The union's grievance against Company Two came before Arbitra-
tor B. Arbitrator B denied the grievance, reasoning that, although the
employee could not be faulted for being absent, because of Company
Two's need for a reliable workforce, it could not be expected to continue
employing a worker who was not showing up for work, regardless of the
reasons for the absences.
Arbitrators A and B reached completely opposite results despite ap-
plying identical governing language to virtually identical fact situations.
Their inconsistent conclusions resulted from their different personal per-
spectives on workplace justice. Arbitrator A approached the issue of just
cause for discharge from the perspective of employee expectations of job
security and the belief that employees should be terminated only for cul-
pable misconduct. Arbitrator B approached the issue from the perspec-
tive of employer needs and the employee's inability to meet those needs
regardless of culpability.
Both decisions fall within the range of options that the parties'
agreement gave the arbitrator for resolving the disputes, i.e., both deci-
sions draw their essence from the contracts' just cause provisions. In
each case the parties gave the arbitrator the authority to resolve the dis-
pute in accordance with her personal perspectives on just cause for dis-
missal. Each arbitrator performed that task. Moreover, each arbitrator's
decision became the common law of the shop only in the company in
which it was rendered. Each decision is binding in future cases within
that company only to the extent that future arbitrators choose to follow
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it. Thus, a court need not be concerned that the decisions are inconsis-
tent because each decision stands on its own within the separate private
governance system where it was rendered. Both decisions are entitled to
judicial enforcement.
The union's remedy in Company Two is to seek express language in
the collective bargaining agreement precluding the company from penal-
izing employees for absences due to legitimate illnesses. Alternatively,
the union may seek to relitigate the issue the next time it arises before a
different arbitrator and try to persuade him or her to disregard the prior
award. Similarly, Company One's remedy is to seek contract language
expressly authorizing it to count illness-related absences to the extent
they exceed paid sick leave or to relitigate the issue the next time it arises
before a different arbitrator. The only body of law in this private system
that results from the arbitrator's award is the resolution of the particular
grievance. Thus, the Legal Realist model appropriately defines the con-
straints on arbitral decision-making and the very limited availability of
judicial review because of the private nature of the grievance arbitration
system.
A Legal Realist model also corresponds descriptively to widespread
beliefs shared by labor, management, arbitrators, and courts about the
proper adjudicatory role of labor arbitrators. 148 The parties typically
148. Leading arbitrators have expressly relied on the Legal Realist model in discussing
how they decide cases. For example, at the 1961 meeting of the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors, Sylvester Garrett, a former president of the National Academy of Arbitrators and chair
of the U.S. Steel-United Steelworkers Board of Arbitration, relied on legal realist writings in
describing how arbitrators decide grievances:
The creative and intuitive nature of this [decision-making] function... has a coun-
terpart in the conventional judicial process. Judges are not often driven to given
results in difficult cases by the inexorable compulsion of concepts, maxims, logic, and
language. Almost always there is a choice among several potentially applicable sets
of principles.
One knowledgeable judge... has written that the vital motivating impulse for
judicial decision often is a "hunch" or intuition as to what is right or wrong for the
particular case. Judge Hutcheson's explanation of the opinion-writing process will
seem familiar to many an arbitrator. He went on to write that, having reached a
"hunch" decision:
... the astute judge, having so decided, enlists his every faculty and belabors his
laggard mind, not only to justify that intuition to himself, but to make it pass muster
with his critics.
Sylvester Garrett, The Role of Lawyers in Arbitration, PROC. 14TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD.
ARB. 102, 122 (1961) (citing Joseph C. Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of
the "Hunch" in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1929)). Twenty-four years
later, Mr. Garrett reiterated his recitation of the Legal Realist model of arbitral decision-
making and observed that since his initial observations, many other arbitrators had expressly
concurred with that model. Garrett, supra note 145, at 144-46 (citing, inter alia, Gabriel N.
Alexander, Reflections on Decision Making, PROC. 15TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 7
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recognize the arbitrator's wide range of discretion. They also realize that
the arbitrator's personal perspective on labor relations, as influenced by
her background, training, and ideological viewpoints, can play a major
role in resolution of the grievance. Consequently, the parties often pay
attention to these matters when selecting an arbitrator. Arbitrator ap-
pointing agencies, which provide the parties in a case with a panel of
arbitrators from which to choose, usually supply the parties with back-
ground information about the potential arbitrators' training and experi-
ence. Parties frequently research potential arbitrators' prior awards and
other writings to gain insight into their perspectives on workplace is-
sues. 149 Arbitrators whose understanding and perspectives do not meet
the parties' expectations simply do not get selected to hear grievances.
Consequently, arbitrators who are selected share a common understand-
ing about collective bargaining and their roles in that process. 150
Consequently, from a descriptive standpoint, the parties' expecta-
tions enter into both the personal and institutional constraints upon labor
arbitrators in three ways. First, arbitrators have a personal interest in
conforming their decisions to those expectations. Those who deviate too
widely from the parties' expectations, for example by placing the burden
of proof in a discharge case on the union, will not likely continue to
receive appointments. Second, as a general matter, the parties select ar-
bitrators whose personal understandings and perspectives conform to
(1962)); Peter Seitz, How Arbitrators Decide Cases: A Study in Black Magic, PROC. 15TH ANN.
MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 159 (1962); see also Decisional Thinking: Chicago Panel Report,
PROC. 33D ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 63, 84-87 (1980); Decisional Thinking: West Coast
Panel Report, PROC. 33D MTG NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 119, 124-30 (1980).
149. See, e.g., Nels E. Nelson, The Selection of Arbitrators, 37 LAB. L.J. 703 (1986).
150. Professor John Dunsford, a former president of the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors, has observed that once selected to hear a case, an arbitrator's options in handling the
matter are practically unlimited. The only meaningful restraints are those tacitly conveyed by
the parties as to their expectations. As an arbitrator's reputation and docket grow, a reciprocal
conditioning comes into play. The parties are presumed to be familiar with the arbitrator's
conduct, rulings, and decisions and, by their selection, represent the arbitrator's past perform-
ance to be their expected standard for the current matter. Dunsford, supra note 79, at 112-13.
Similarly, Edgar Jones, another former Academy president, has commented on the link
between the parties' selection process and the legitimate role of the arbitrator's personal values
in resolving a grievance: "[I]n this process of competitive selection, 'his own brand' was ana-
lyzed and adopted [by the parties] as their own brand [of justice], whatever may have been
their respective expectations .... Edgar A. Jones, Jr., A Meditation on Labor Arbitration and
"His Own Brand of Industrial Justice," PROC. 35TH ANN. MTG. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 1, 11
(1982) (emphasis in original). Therefore, it is not surprising that parties are very reluctant to
select an arbitrator with whom they have had no experience. See id. at 8-11; MAX ZIMMY &
CHRISTOPHER BARRECA, Views of the Parties, in LABOR ARBITRATOR DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 43, at 194 (management and union lawyers acknowledging that the first thing they look
for in evaluating prospective arbitrators is whether they have had prior experience with the
arbitrator in question).
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their expectations. Third, labor arbitrators, by and large, tend to inter-
nalize the general expectations of parties as a critical component of their
respective personal standards of fairness. Even a labor arbitrator who
genuinely does not care about future appointments, perhaps because of
plans to retire, is not very likely to deviate from the parties' general ex-
pectations in deciding cases.
A Legal Realist approach to the constraints on labor arbitrators also
accounts for the extremely limited external constraints imposed by
courts. Under The Trilogy, if the arbitration award draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement, Le., if the arbitrator has re-
solved the dispute within the confines of the contract's general code, the
court must enforce the award. This is true even if the award is inconsis-
tent with the court's view of the facts or the contract language, with
other arbitrators' awards interpreting the same contract, or with the ap-
proach of a large percentage of arbitrators interpreting similar language
under other contracts. When the parties receive the award, they get
what they bargained for. Essentially, when the parties have been unable
to agree on what the contract means in a given situation, they have
agreed that the contract means whatever the arbitrator says it means.
Under this analysis, H.L.A. Hart's version of Legal Positivism can
be ruled out as a theory of the adjudicatory role in labor arbitration.
Hart's emphasis on the responsibility of an adjudicator to focus on core
meanings cannot apply to the inherently broad and general provisions of
a collective bargaining agreement. The breadth and generality of the
agreement's provisions directly reflect the parties' intent to defer ques-
tions about what the provisions mean until a later time. In this respect, a
collective bargaining agreement resembles a political constitution, but
with a key difference. It is private rather than public law. A collective
bargaining agreement specifies the fundamental law, but only as it applies
to the relationship between two parties. For this reason, Ronald Dwor-
kin's conception of Law as Integrity likewise does not apply to labor
arbitration. 151 The principal responsibility of an adjudicator under Law
as Integrity is to make the law better in the sense of more logically and
ethically coherent. This responsibility concerns the law itself. In con-
trast, a labor arbitrator's principal responsibility is to interpret and apply
the broad provisions of a collective bargaining agreement in order to re-
solve a particular impasse between two private parties.
151. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567-68 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960);




Under the current judicial approach to employment arbitration,
courts do not require arbitrators to explain the reasons behind their
awards. Arbitral errors of law are not grounds for judicial vacation of an
arbitration award, unless the award displays a manifest disregard for the
law. 152 When parties agree to arbitrate a claim, courts regard them as
having traded "legal precision" for speed, efficiency, and informality in
dispute settlement.153 In other words, under the prevailing judicial view,
an agreement to arbitrate represents a decision to opt out of the public
legal system and into a private system that places primary value on dis-
pute resolution. 54 According to this view, the only law that results is
the award itself, and that law is binding only on the immediate parties.
The current judicial view of employment arbitration thus extends
the Legal Realist framework to employment arbitration, in which the
arbitrator interprets and applies public law to resolve a dispute arising
out of the workplace. It is inappropriate, however, to extend the Legal
Realist framework to employment arbitration because the arbitrator's ap-
plication of public law to private disputes poses special problems not
present in labor arbitration under collective bargaining. The following
example illustrates these problems.
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act makes it unlawful "to dis-
criminate ... with respect to ... terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment, because of. . .race."155 Assume that Companies One and
152. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
153. See Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214 (2d Cir. 1972); see also Rai-
ford v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (11th Cir. 1990)
("When the parties agreed to submit to arbitration, they also agreed to accept whatever rea-
sonable uncertainties might arise from the process.").
154. See Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L. REV. 81, 102
(1992). Some courts go even further and regard the parties who have agreed to arbitrate as
having opted out of the substantive rules of public law as well as the public legal process. For
example, in refusing to vacate a nonunion employment arbitration award, the California
Supreme Court opined:
Because the decision to arbitrate grievances evinces the parties' intent to bypass the
judicial system ... finality is a core component of the parties' agreement .... [More-
over,] arbitrators, unless specifically required to act in conformity with rules of law,
may base their decision upon broad principles of justice and equity, and in doing so
may expressly or impliedly reject a claim that a party might successfully have as-
serted in a judicial action.... Parties who stipulate in an agreement that controver-
sies that may arise out of it shall be settled by arbitration, may expect not only to
reap the advantages that flow from the use of that nontechnical, summary procedure,
but also to find themselves bound by an award reached by paths neither marked nor
traceable and not subject to judicial review.
Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, 832 P.2d 899, 903-04 (Cal. 1992) (citations omitted).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1988).
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Two are competing insurance agencies. Both are located in a metropoli-
tan area with housing patterns that exhibit a high degree of racial segre-
gation. Both hire sales representatives without regard to race. Both have
concluded that a significant number of potential customers will be more
likely to purchase insurance from a sales representative who is a member
of their race. Furthermore, both have concluded that although there are
many potential customers who regard the race of the sales representative
as irrelevant, there are few if any who are more likely to buy insurance
from a sales representative of a different race. Therefore, both conclude
that it is good business practice to assign white sales representatives to
their offices that serve predominantly white areas and African-American
sales representatives to their offices that serve predominantly black areas.
As a result, each company is challenged under Title VII by its employ-
ees, but the Title VII claims come before different arbitrators.
Arbitrator A sustains the claim against Company One, reasoning
that job assignments are conditions of employment and that the statute
prohibits basing those assignments on race, regardless of motivation or
effect. Arbitrator B rejects the claim against Company Two, reasoning
that it did not use race in deciding whether to hire sales representatives,
that all sales representatives were given the same job duties regardless of
race, and that assignments to particular offices were not racially moti-
vated, but were instead a direct response to market pressures. Arbitrator
B further observes that the assignment scheme worked to the advantage
of the company and the sales representatives because it maximized the
company's profits and the sales representatives' commissions by maxi-
mizing potential sales.
Unlike the cases of the employees discharged for absenteeism in
which two arbitrators produced conflicting decisions in separate systems
of private law, here, two arbitrators have produced conflicting decisions
in a single system of public law. These conflicting decisions, resulting
from the respective employment arbitrators' different personal perspec-
tives on Title VII, and their differing views on what constitutes racial
discrimination, pose a deep problem.
First, if the conflict is allowed to stand, Company One will be at a
competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis Company Two. In the absenteeism la-
bor arbitration the conflicting results also placed Company One at a
competitive disadvantage by forcing it to retain an employee who, be-
cause of illness, had an unreliable attendance record. Company One's
competitive disadvantage in that case, however, was of its own making
because it resulted from its own system of private law as interpreted by
its own private adjudicator. Company One's competitive disadvantage in
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the insurance case is not of its own making. Rather, it is imposed on
Company One by conflicting interpretations of public law.
Second, Company One has a remedy for its competitive disadvan-
tage in the absenteeism case. It can return to the bargaining table and try
to persuade the union to agree to express provisions in the contract giv-
ing it authority to terminate workers whose excessive absenteeism is
caused by illness. By contrast, in the insurance case Company One has
no such remedy because it lacks the direct control over the statute that it
has over the contract in the absenteeism case.
Third, Arbitrator B's interpretation, when measured against judicial
and administrative agency interpretations of Title VII, is incorrect. 156
By enacting Title VII, Congress recognized that private markets do not
prevent racial discrimination. 57 For example, assume that both compa-
nies would prefer to assign their sales representatives without regard to
race. Neither company acting alone will do so because it runs a substan-
tial risk of losing business to the other. When both act alone they end up
in a less than optimal situation-they stay competitively equal but have
racially segregated sales forces that they would prefer not to have. Be-
cause of this prisoner's dilemma,1 5 8 a competitive market actually pre-
vents an otherwise efficient solution to a problem of racial discrimination.
Title VII recognizes this imperfection in the private market and solves
the dilemma.
156. See, e.g., EEOC Dec. 70350, 2 F.E.P. Cas. (BNA) 498 (1969); cf. Fernandez v. Wynn
Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that the belief that customers in foreign coun-
try will refuse to do business with women because of that country's culture does not make sex
a bona fide occupational qualification under Title VII); Baker v. City of St. Petersburg, 400
F.2d 294 (5th Cir. 1968) (holding that assignment of black police officers to patrol only
predominantly black residential and business districts violates the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause).
157. See Cass Sunstein, Why Markets Don't Stop Discrimination, Soc. PHIL. & POL.,
Spring 1991, at 22.
158. A prisoner's dilemma is usually explained with the following example. Imagine two
prisoners charged as coparticipants in an armed robbery who are interrogated separately by
the prosecutor. The prosecutor tells each prisoner the following. If neither confesses, they will
each serve one year in prison. If one confesses to armed robbery and testifies against the other,
he will go free, while the other will receive a ten-year sentence. If both confess, each will
receive a five-year sentence. In this situation, each prisoner acting alone has a sufficient motive
to confess regardless of what the other does, even though the most reasonable course of action
for the two prisoners together is for both not to confess to armed robbery.
Frequently the relationship between rival businesses exemplifies a prisoner's dilemma
(though often of a more complex kind involving more than just two parties). Under the exam-
ple given in the text, because each firm prefers not to assign sales representatives on the basis of
race, the best outcome for all would result if every firm refused to discriminate. On the other
hand, the decision of any given firm to repudiate discrimination regardless of what other firms
might do would be fraught with economic peril. For this reason, prisoner's dilemma reasoning
provided some of the strongest arguments in favor of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
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On the other hand, assume that both companies wish to cooperate,
so that neither will suffer a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis the other
by integrating its sales force. Unfortunately, they each still might have a
motive not to integrate because they might conclude, either separately or
together, that integrated sales forces in both companies may produce a
lower level of overall insurance sales. That is, for some extremely big-
oted customers, the prospect of buying insurance from a representative of
a different race will be so odious that they will spend their money on
other financial products.
Title VII represents a public justice value judgment that the elimina-
tion of racial discrimination is so important that forcing employers to
bear some of the costs of pursuing that goal is justified. The extent of the
costs that employers must bear is not specified in the statute. That issue
is delegated to politically accountable judges and administrative agencies
to determine as a matter of interpretation. Under a system in which em-
ployment arbitrators make final and binding decisions in cases involving
charges of discrimination based on Title VII, there will be serious con-
cern about whether those decisions adequately reflect the public justice
values at the heart of the statute.
The Legal Realist account of the adjudicatory role underlying labor
arbitration thus does not apply to arbitration of claims based on employ-
ment statutes, such as Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. In employ-
ment arbitration, the arbitrator does not interpret private law, but public
law. Interpreting public law implicates major public decisions that re-
flect the weighing and balancing of important social values by the legisla-
ture. It follows that the private expectations of the parties that provide
the principal check on the labor arbitrator's use of her own justice values
can not serve the same function for the employment arbitrator.
Although in some cases the parties' expectations may coincide with the
overall value judgments reflected in the enactment of various public laws,
the coincidence is not inherent in the private arbitration system. More-
over, parties cannot give the arbitrator the authority to apply personal
viewpoints of justice in interpreting public law.
If Legal Realism fails to provide a normatively desirable theory of
employment arbitration, what personal and institutional constraints
should apply to the arbitrator's decision? Employment arbitrators
should personally regard themselves as under a strong constraint to de-
cide cases in terms of the settled meanings of statutory terms and prece-
dential language. In other words, H.L.A. Hart's version of Legal
Positivism provides the best jurisprudential framework for analyzing the
personal constraints on employment arbitrators. From an institutional
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standpoint, courts should subject employment arbitrators' interpretations
of statutes to de novo review.
One might suppose that the need to interpret public law brings the
employment arbitrator's adjudicatory role within the scope of Dworkin's
model of Law as Integrity. This conclusion is not correct for the follow-
ing reason.
Dworkin's view affords a major role in the development of the law
to the independent judgments of judges. They must balance diverse con-
cerns in each case to reach the result that best promotes the law's devel-
opment. Furthermore, such balancing involves application of principles
to a case which, at times, may weigh heavily toward a particular result
but never command it. In any given case, weightier principles may tilt
the balance toward another result, such as when judges decide to over-
rule existing case law.
The judge's role, as envisioned by Dworkin, is legitimate because of
the judge's political accountability. First, judges are screened at the out-
set for their social and political values, either directly by the electorate or
through the appointment and confirmation process. Second, judges act
within a unitary legal system, characterized by provision for review of
judges' decisions up to review by a judicially supreme tribunal. Third,
even though it is final within the judicial system, the law as decreed by
the judicially supreme tribunal is ultimately revisable by the legislature.
When the legislature enacts a statute with broad language, one may rea-
sonably infer a legislative intent to invest judges with authority to refine
the public law through case-by-case interpretation, guided by the concep-
tion of Law as Integrity. The legitimate authority of judges in the system
to interpret and apply statutes is accordingly conferred upon them by the
initial lawmakers, i.e., the legislature, just as labor arbitrators derive their
legitimate authority to interpret and apply collective bargaining agree-
ments through the initial lawmakers, i.e., the parties. 5 9
Dworkin's model of Law as Integrity thus provides a reasonable ac-
count of the constraints on an adjudicator in light of an institutional
background containing three key elements: (1) prior screening of judges'
social and political values, (2) extensive judicial review within the system
of judges' decisions, and (3) ultimate authority of the legislature to revise
law as interpreted by the highest court in the system. Privately ap-
pointed arbitrators apply public law, but not within a system of public
law containing these three elements. For this reason, one cannot reason-
159. Administrative agencies derive a similar legitimacy when the legislature delegates the
primary task of interpretation to them. See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Counsel, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
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ably apply the wide scope of independent adjudicatory discretion under
Law as Integrity to employment arbitrators. An employment arbitrator,
for example, has no legitimate authority to overrule existing case law or
even to severely limit its reach. The case law emanating from politically
accountable judges must be binding on privately appointed arbitrators
who lack the judge's institutional legitimacy. 160
Employment statutes represent legislative determinations that pub-
lic justice values require the substitution of uniform labor standards for
terms and conditions of employment that would otherwise be privately
bargained for in the marketplace. 161 The appropriate institutional frame-
work for ensuring that there will be uniform labor standards is a unified
court system designed to produce a single, socially binding interpretation
of the law. 162 The decisions of employment arbitrators, however, are not
linked together through such a system. Each decision is binding only on
the parties in the actual case.163
160. The Supreme Court has recognized this on several occasions when it has held that
statutory claims are independent of grievances and that the result of grievance arbitration does
not per se preclude litigation of a statutory claim arising out of the same incident. See, ag.,
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56-57
(1974).
161. For example, the Senate report accompanying the Family and Medical Leave Act of
1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. and
29 U.S.C. (Supp. V 1993)), described the act in the context of other employment statutes as
follows:
Even without minimum standards most employers would pay a living wage, take
steps to protect the health and safety of their work force, and offer their employees
decent benefits. A central reason that labor standards are necessary is to relieve the
competitive pressure placed on responsible employers by employers who act irre-
sponsibly. Federal labor standards take broad societal concerns out of the competi-
tive process so that conscientious employers are not forced to compete with
unscrupulous employers.
S. REP. No. 3, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
162. It is certainly possible for a legislature to enact a statute that sets broad guidelines for
conduct but does not command refinement of those guidelines in a uniform manner. In such a
case, the constraints on arbitrators adjudicating claims under the statute would be weaker than
the constraints we advocate for adjudicating statutory employment claims.
163. See Barrowclough v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923 (3d Cir. 1985). In Bar-
rowclough, the court enforced an employment agreement to arbitrate claims under ERISA for
unpaid benefits, reasoning that the claims were based on the terms of the private employee
benefit plan. It refused to compel arbitration of claims based on the statute that were in-
dependent of the terms of the plan, such as the statutory disclosure and fiduciary duty provi-
sions. The court reasoned that Congress intended to establish uniform federal standards for
employee benefit plans and to provide a consistent body of law to guide plan administrators,
fiduciaries, and participants in planning their actions. Id. at 939-41. Because decisions of
private arbitrators fall outside the unified legal system, referral of these statutory claims to
arbitration would defeat the congressional goal of uniform standards. Id. at 941.
Barrowclough, however, may be inconsistent with the Supreme Court's current FAA ju-
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For this reason, an employment arbitrator who wants to interpret a
statute in a way that reflects the congressional goal of uniform standards
has a difficult problem. She must try tacitly to coordinate her decision
on a particular issue with the decisions on the same issue made by other
employment arbitrators working in isolation from her.164
This problem instantiates a broader problem, described by the econ-
omist Thomas Schelling as that of achieving tacit coordination between
parties with identical interests when communication is impossible. 65
Schelling hypothesizes a situation in which two individuals become sepa-
rated in a store without prior arrangements for handling such a situa-
tion.166 Schelling suggests that it is very likely they will each think of the
same place to meet, because the place will be obvious to both of them. 167
Each individual will ask herself what location her companion is likely to
think of, and what location her companion is likely to deduce that she
will think of. According to Shelling, "What is necessary is to coordinate
predictions, to read the same message in the common situation, to iden-
tify the one course of action that their expectations of each other can
converge on."' 168
Schelling's observations suggest a plausible answer to the question of
what values should guide an employment arbitrator dealing with a claim
under a statute. In this circumstance, an employment arbitrator needs to
identify an interpretation of relevant law with respect to the issue at hand
on which the expectations of other employment arbitrators, dealing with
the same issue, can converge.
One characteristic that every employment arbitrator shares is the
lack of public accountability. Consequently, the point of convergence
around which arbitrators tacitly coordinate their decisions should reflect
the public justice values already articulated and applied by publicly ac-
risprudence. See G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is
Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts? 68 TEX. L. REV. 509, 562-
65 (1990). Gilmer's very strong presumption that statutory claims are arbitrable certainly calls
into question Barrowclough's continuing validity. It is not likely that the Supreme Court will
infer congressional intent to preclude arbitration from intent to impose uniform labor
standards.
164. This concern is not merely theoretical. A review by one federal appellate judge of
published grievance arbitration awards under nondiscrimination clauses found that they con-
siderably lacked uniformity in dealing with the concept of nondiscrimination. Betty Binnis
Fletcher, Arbitration of Title VII Claims: Some Judicial Perceptions, PROC. 34TH ANN. MTG.
NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 218, 221 (1981).






countable and, accordingly, institutionally competent legislatures,
judges, and administrative agencies.
Accordingly, employment arbitrators' need for tacit coordination to
properly serve public justice values, coupled with their absence of public
accountability, compels that they adopt a judicially cautious approach to
statutory interpretation. Such an approach has two components. First,
consistent with H.L.A. Hart's theory of Legal Positivism, employment
arbitrators should regard themselves as under a strong personal con-
straint to decide cases in terms of the settled meanings of statutory terms
and precedential language. But Hart's theory acknowledges the exist-
ence of a penumbral zone in which an adjudicator must go beyond settled
meanings of statutory terms or precedential language to interpret rele-
vant law in terms of ethical and social values. 169 So second, when deal-
ing with issues in Hart's penumbral zone, employment arbitrators should
continue to place predominant value on judicial caution. When ex-
tending current law, they should regard themselves as constrained to do
so in relatively familiar and unsurprising ways. This approach will maxi-
mize the probability of convergence, at least as compared with a bold,
novel, or ideologically charged interpretation. 170
The value placed on judicial caution is not unique to employment
arbitration. One finds it elsewhere as well, such as in adjudication by
appellate courts. For appellate courts, however, the value of judicial cau-
tion does not predominate. Instead, judicial caution needs to be balanced
carefully against other values emphasized by Dworkin in his Law as In-
tegrity model, which relate to promoting greater logical and ethical co-
herence in various areas of law. In this regard, a publicly accountable
appellate judge should depart from the most cautious approach to inter-
preting a particular statute when she firmly believes that a bolder, more
novel interpretive stance would significantly further the overarching
goal, under Dworkin's Law as Integrity, of improving the law as a whole.
In contrast, a privately accountable employment arbitrator should exer-
cise judicial caution and maximize convergence of her interpretation of a
statute with the interpretations of other employment arbitrators, even if
she believes that better law would result from a more creative
interpretation.
169. See supra notes 124-128 and accompanying text.
170. The high value employment arbitrators should give to judicial caution is linked con-
ceptually to Hart's distinction between a core of settled meaning and a penumbral zone of
statutory and precedential language. The word "caution" generally refers to the exercise of
special care when departing from a status quo. In the context of adjudication, it is difficult to
say what the idea of a status quo could mean, other than a consensually settled interpretation
of key terms in statutes and prior cases.
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To illustrate the exercise of judicial caution as a personal constraint
on employment arbitrators, assume that an arbitrator faced the following
claim in early 1989. An employer in Missouri maintained a pension plan
that provided retirement benefits to employees based on age and length of
service. To receive benefits, retirees had to be at least fifty-five years old
or have at least twenty-five years of service. An employee who suffered a
permanent disability, however, could receive benefits if she had at least
five years of service. The plan guaranteed that permanently disabled em-
ployees would receive benefits equal to at least thirty percent of their final
average salaries. The guarantee only applied if the disabled retiree was
younger than age sixty. The employer could show no correlation be-
tween being sixty years or older and the cost of providing disability re-
tirement benefits.
A sixty-one-year-old employee claimed that she was forced to take
regular pension benefits rather than disability retirement benefits because
of her age, and that this resulted in substantially lower benefits. An arbi-
tration provision in her employment agreement forced her to bring her
claim under the ADEA to an arbitrator. The employer defended by rely-
ing on Section 4(0(2) of the ADEA which, at the time, provided that it
was not a violation for an employer to follow the provisions of a "bona
fide employee benefit plan ... which [was] not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of [the statute]." 171
In early 1989, the EEOC, 172 the agency charged with the adminis-
tration of the ADEA, and the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second,
Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits173 had all interpreted
Section 4(0(2) to apply only when the reduction in benefits for older
workers was necessary because the costs of providing such benefits in-
creased with age. Missouri, however, is in the Eighth Circuit and that
Court of Appeals had yet to decide whether Section 4(0(2) should be so
narrowly interpreted.
Assume that the arbitrator examined the language and legislative
history of Section 4(0(2) and concluded that the EEOC and the several
circuit courts had interpreted the provision too narrowly. As she read
171. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988).
172. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.10 (1988).
173. Betts v. Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation, 848 F.2d 692 (6th Cir. 1988),
rev'd sub nom. Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989); EEOC v. City
of Mt. Lebanon, 842 F.2d 1480 (3d Cir. 1988); Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, 837 F.2d
314 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cook County College Teachers Union Local 1600 v. City
Colleges of Chicago, 486 U.S. 1044 (1988); Cipriano v. Board of Educ., 785 F.2d 51 (2d Cir.
1986); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 725 F.2d 211 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
820 (1984); EEOC v. Borden's, Inc., 724 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984).
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the statute, it protected employers from liability as long as the benefit
plan was not used to mask age discrimination in aspects of employment
not involving fringe benefits. Such an interpretation is not only reason-
able, it was the interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court later that
year. 174
Had the case come before a federal district judge in Missouri, the
absence of Eighth Circuit precedent on point would have left the judge
free to express her disagreement with the other circuits and the EEOC
and adopt a broad interpretation of Section 4(f)(2). Her boldness in do-
ing so would have been vindicated later that year by the Supreme Court.
But, because the arbitrator lacked the legitimacy of a publicly accounta-
ble judge and was outside the unitary judicial system, she would have
been constrained by judicial caution to follow the consensus interpreta-
tion adopted by the other circuit courts and the EEOC, even though the
arbitrator believed, correctly as it turned out, that a bolder approach
would have better developed the law.
The differing personal constraints on judges and arbitrators reflects
a problematic feature of the proposal contained in this Article. If judges,
constrained by the principle of integrity, may appropriately balance both
of Dworkin's dimensions in shaping the law, arbitrators constrained by a
theory of judicial caution may, in a particular case, give inappropriate
weight to the first dimension at the expense of the second.
The approach followed in this Article raises additional problems.
Hart criticized other jurisprudential theories, such as Legal Realism, for
being preoccupied with the penumbra.1 75 Many of Hart's critics contend
that his theory is preoccupied with the core. These critics argue that,
more often than not, an adjudicator attempting to analyze a statute's key
provisions finds herself led into the penumbral zone. 176 To tell employ-
ment arbitrators that they should resolve penumbral issues by placing a
predominant value upon judicial caution is vague advice that, at most,
only helps move them a little closer toward convergence than they might
otherwise get. The inadequacies of the personal constraints in safeguard-
ing public justice values reinforces the importance of the institutional
constraint on arbitral adjudication.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,177 a case re-
viewing a complex securities consumer arbitration, illustrates the inade-
174. Public Employee Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
175. Hart, supra note 120, at 614-15.
176. See, eg., Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71
HARV. L. REv. 630, 664-65 (1958).
177. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), rev'g 636 F. Supp. 444 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
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quacies of the manifest disregard of the law standard of judicial review.
Philips Petroleum Company had issued a pro-rated tender offer for its
stock. Bobker instructed Merrill, Lynch to tender all 4,000 shares of
Philips in his Merrill, Lynch account. Merrill, Lynch complied. Bobker
subsequently instructed Merrill, Lynch to sell short 2,000 shares of
Philips stock. Merrill, Lynch refused to do so.
Bobker instituted arbitration proceedings to recover the profits he
would have made had Merrill, Lynch executed the sell short order. Mer-
rill, Lynch defended on the ground that the instruction violated Rule
lOb-4 of the Securities Exchange Commission. 178 The arbitration panel
awarded Bobker $12,500.
Upon Merrill, Lynch's petition, the trial court vacated the award.
The court, aided by a requested amicus brief of the SEC, reasoned that
Rule lOb-4 prohibited hedged tendering of the type in which Bobker at-
tempted to engage. Rule 10b-4 provided that a person tendering shares
in a pro-rated tender offer must be net long in all shares tendered both at
the time of tender and as of the offer's cutoff date. A person is "net long"
if the number of shares tendered is offset by the number of shares sold.
Had Merrill, Lynch executed the sell short order, Bobker would have
been net long for only 2,000 of the 4,000 shares tendered and would have
been in violation of Rule lOb-4.
The district court reviewed the arbitration transcript and found that
the arbitrators were aware of Rule 10b-4 but ignored it. The court va-
cated the award because of the arbitrators' manifest disregard for the
law, observing, "Permitting this award to stand would have the unac-
ceptable result of penalizing Merrill, Lynch for acting in accordance with
the law." 179
The Second Circuit reversed. The court criticized Rule 10b-4's net
long requirements, suggesting that the rule was not a valid interpretation
of section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act.180 The court did not
decide, however, whether Rule lOb-4 was a valid rule. It merely ob-
served that because of doubts concerning the validity of the rule and be-
cause those doubts were raised in the arbitration, the award did not
display a manifest disregard for the law.181
178. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (1990).
179. 636 F. Supp. at 447-48.
180. 808 F.2d at 935-36.
181. Id. at 936-37. We note that if the arbitrators based their awards on their view that
Rule lOb-4 was invalid, they did not act in accordance with our view that judicial caution
should constrain arbitrators interpreting statutes. An arbitral judicial caution approach would
defer to the regulation of the politically accountable administrative agency, rather than take
the bold step of finding it to be an invalid interpretation of the statute.
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Had the arbitrators applied Rule 10b-4 and denied the claim, their
award clearly would not have displayed a manifest disregard for the law.
The application of the manifest disregard standard thus leaves securities
arbitrators free of institutional constraints to enforce Rule 10b-4 or not
as they see fit. As a result, investors have no way of knowing whether
hedged tendering is lawful. Brokers are in an untenable position. If they
refuse hedged tender orders, they risk liability for doing so. If they ac-
cept them, they risk liability for violating Rule 10b-4.
The court's criticisms of Rule lOb-4 display a disagreement with the
SEC over interpretation of section 10(b). Had the court held the rule
invalid, the clash of public justice values between a court and the agency
charged with administering the statute might have led to Supreme Court
or congressional resolution of the issue. Instead, the court short-cir-
cuited the very process that gives public law its legitimacy by leaving the
validity of Rule lOb-4 outside of the unitary public justice system.
To ensure that public law continues to develop in accordance with
public justice values as articulated by publicly accountable judges con-
strained by the principle of integrity, arbitral legal conclusions must be
subject to de novo judicial or administrative review. Only the judge has
the legitimacy conferred by the legislature to authoritatively continue the
chain novel based on a balancing of Dworkin's dimensions. Of course,
judges are not infallible. Judicial mistakes are, however, more likely to
be corrected legislatively because of their sweeping precedential value
than are arbitral mistakes which have no stare decisis value. Indeed, the
history of employment discrimination laws is replete with legislative cor-
rection ofjudicial mistakes. When the Supreme Court held that discrim-
ination on the basis of pregnancy was not per se discrimination on the
basis of sex, 182 Congress responded with the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act of 1978.183 When the Court held that mandatory retirement did not
violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 184 Congress re-
sponded with the 1978 Amendments to the ADEA. 185 When the Court
held that the ADEA does not require that age differentials in fringe bene-
fits be cost-justified,1 86 Congress responded with the Older Workers Ben-
efits Protection Act. 187 When the Court held that employers do not have
182. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
183. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1988)).
184. United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192 (1977).
185. Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1614 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1988)).
186. Betts, 492 U.S. at 158.
187. Pub. L. No. 101-438, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634).
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the burden of proving a business necessity to justify practices that have a
disparate impact on protected classes,188 that section 1981 does not cover
post-hiring racial discrimination, 89 and that allegations that a change in
a seniority system must be attacked at the time the change is made,
rather than when the change results in layoffs, 190 Congress responded
with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.191
Concerns of legitimacy and inadequate personal constraints on arbi-
tral decision-making mandate the strong institutional constraint of de
novo judicial review. Nevertheless, courts have justified their refusal to
scrutinize arbitral interpretations of statutes on the ground that to do so
would undermine arbitration's finality and, with it, arbitration's effi-
ciency advantages. The efficiency advantages will remain, however, rela-
tively unimpaired under our proposal. De novo review is necessary only
for arbitral conclusions of law. Arbitral factual findings remain properly
constrained by the parties' expectations and the minimal standards em-
bodied in the FAA and UAA. Together these statutes constrain the arbi-
trator to conduct the hearing fairly and impartially, and find the facts
with reason and integrity. There is no reason to subject employment ar-
bitration's factual findings to judicial review beyond these minimalist
standards of fairness. There is no reason to treat them any differently
than grievance arbitration's factual findings.
Accordingly, we advocate a dual standard of review of employment
arbitration awards: broad deference to arbitral factual findings and de
novo review of arbitral legal conclusions. Most of the delay and expense
of litigation may be attributed to the judicial system's formalistic proce-
dures for factual inquiry. Were the facts undisputed, a lawsuit could be
resolved quickly and cheaply through cross motions for summary judg-
ment. Thus, making arbitration of the facts effectively final and binding
preserves most of the efficiency gains that arbitration may offer. Further-
more, because most statutory employment claims are predominantly
fact-based, the availability of de novo review of arbitral interpretations of
law will have minimal impact on the overall finality of employment arbi-
tration. The availability of de novo legal review, however, will provide
the legitimacy that would otherwise be lacking in the privatization of
public workplace justice.
188. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
189. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
190. Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900 (1989).




The success of arbitration as a mechanism for resolving disputes
under collective bargaining agreements has prompted an increasing
number of employers to use it as a means for resolving disputes arising
under employment statutes in the nonunionized workplace. Grievance
arbitration in the unionized workplace is part of the continuing process
of collective bargaining. Thus, labor arbitration functions as an integral
part of the process of workplace self-government. The arbitrator is pri-
vately accountable to the parties who appoint her to interpret and apply
the parties' private law.
Employment arbitration in the nonunionized workplace does not
serve the same function. Rather, its justification is as a faster, less expen-
sive method than litigation for resolving statutory claims. Because the
privately appointed and privately accountable arbitrator is called upon to
interpret and apply public law, many are concerned that arbitration's
efficiency gains come at a cost of diminished protection for public justice
values expressed in statutes. The constraints on adjudicators inherent in
different theories about the nature of law provide a way out of this unde-
sirable trade-off.
Legal Realism appropriately characterizes the personal and institu-
tional constraints on labor arbitrators. As the parties' designated inter-
preter of their system of private law, a labor arbitrator is granted
legitimate authority to apply personal standards of justice to the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Arbitrators who apply their personal stan-
dards of justice give the parties exactly what they bargained for as long as
the arbitrators stay within the range of options arguably available under
the contract. Consequently, judicial review of labor arbitration awards is
confined generally to ensuring that the arbitrator stayed within this
broad range of options.
The current judicial approach to employment arbitration also re-
flects a Legal Realist model. This approach is inappropriate. Private
employment arbitrators lack legitimate authority to apply personal stan-
dards of justice when interpreting the public law of employment statutes.
Nor do they have the legitimacy to exercise the broad range of discretion
that Ronald Dworkin envisions for the judicial role. The appointment of
a private arbitrator is not publicly screened. Private arbitrators do not
act within a unitary legal system that is characterized by review up to a
judicially supreme tribunal, and subject to ultimate revision by the
legislature.
Consequently, the personal constraints on employment arbitrators
must be stronger than those on labor arbitrators. Employment arbitra-
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tors should be subject to a personal constraint of judicial caution, charac-
terized by H.L.A. Hart's version of Legal Positivism. They should rely
primarily on the core of settled meaning found in statutory language and
judicial decisions. When forced to operate outside the core, they should
avoid a bold or novel interpretation, even though they believe that such
an interpretation is the best one available.
The strong personal constraints appropriate for employment arbi-
trators, by virtue of their lack of public accountability, do not adequately
safeguard public justice values. Accordingly, an even stronger institu-
tional constraint is needed: de novo judicial review of arbitral interpreta-
tions of law. De novo review of legal interpretations will not undermine
the efficiency gains of arbitration if arbitral findings of fact are subject
only to the minimal institutional constraints of procedural fairness recog-
nized in current law. Most expense and delay in litigation results from
the formality of the fact-finding process and most employment claims are
fact-based. Thus, broad deference to arbitral findings of fact will protect
most of the efficiency gained through arbitration and will ensure finality
of most arbitration awards. Moreover, de novo review of arbitral inter-
pretations of law will protect the public justice values expressed in em-
ployment statutes.
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